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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has revolutionized communication, allowing 
people to converse instantaneously at the click of a button.  Young 
people are beginning to use the Internet with a greater frequency and 
at a younger age.1  A 2005 poll showed that 87 percent of kids aged 
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12-17 use the Internet.2  This speech-enhancing medium has led to 
numerous controversies, causing its regulation to become a 
flashpoint in First Amendment jurisprudence.  The rising use of the 
Internet has presented a critical First Amendment question unique to 
public schools: When, if ever, may school administrators punish 
students for the content of their online speech?  Most student blog 
posts create no First Amendment problems.  However, student 
speech that solicits hitmen, makes vicious character assassinations, 
portrays homicidal graphic icons, proposes murder missions, and 
creates mock obituaries plague the online world.3  Some 
administrators, in search of guidance in this new area of law, have 
been lulled into inaction; others have silenced student speech 
occurring outside school grounds.4  What we do know, as discussed 
infra, is that there are more questions than answers in this emerging 
area of law. 
Part II of this Note discusses the background of First 
Amendment student speech cases as decided by the Supreme Court 
as well as a unique classification of lower court holdings.5  Part III 
focuses on Doninger v. Niehoff in detail, including the underlying 
facts, competing arguments, procedural history, and the District of 
Connecticut’s and Second Circuit’s rationale.6  Part IV analyzes why 
this case was wrongly decided and argues that the Supreme Court 
needs to offer more guidance to lower courts so they may apply a 
more consistent standard in student speech cases.7  Further, it 
 
gratitude; to my parents for never getting too mad at me for exercising my own freedom of speech; 
finally, I thank the Akron Law Review staff for all their hard work – any mistakes are mine alone. 
 1. See Emily Nussbaum, Kids, the Internet, and the End of Privacy: The Greatest 
Generation Gap Since Rock and Roll, Feb. 2007, at 2, available at http://nymag.com/news/ 
features/27341 (suggesting that Internet use in the younger generation comes easier to them than it 
does an older generation).   
 2. Pew Internet & American Life Project, Teens and Technology: Youth are Leading the 
Transition to a Fully Wired and Mobile Nation (July 27, 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/PIP_Teens_Tech_July2005web.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).  This figure rose from a mere 
73 percent just five years prior.  Id.  
 3. See infra Section II.B. 
 4. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STUDENT ONLINE EXPRESSION: 
WHAT DO THE INTERNET AND MYSPACE MEAN FOR STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 3 
(2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/student.internetspeech.pdf.  “A big problem is 
that school officials do not understand the technologies or what they can and can’t do legally in 
terms of regulating student online speech.  So we are seeing inaction and overreaction.”  Id. 
(quoting Nancy Willard, head of the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use). 
 5. See infra notes 11-79 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 80-135 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 136-221 and accompanying text.   
2
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suggests a framework courts should adopt in considering a minor’s 
First Amendment rights after school hours.8  Part V concludes that 
this case is part of an emerging area of law that will continue to 
create mass confusion among lower courts unless the Supreme Court 
sets out a universally applicable and practical standard.9   
II. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”10  However, not all speech is protected.  The Supreme Court 
has declined to extend this fundamental right to include “true 
threats.”11  “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”12  While no person can claim a fundamental 
 
The Doninger case is particularly interesting because at the appellate level, Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor endorsed the Second Circuit’s ruling.  Less than a year later, President Barack Obama 
nominated Judge Sotomayor to replace retiring Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The Senate confirmed President Obama’s appointment on August 6, 2009 and Sonia Sotomayor 
became our nation’s first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice., Lisa Desjardins et al., Senate Confirms 
Sonia Sotomayor for Supreme Court, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/sonia.sotomayor/index.html.  Among the President’s 
remarks regarding Sotomayor: “a judge’s job is to interpret, not make, law: to approach decisions 
without any particular ideology or agenda, but rather a commitment to impartial justice; a respect 
for precedent and a determination to faithfully apply the law to the facts at hand.”  The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-
Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court/.   In her 1997 confirmation hearing to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Sotomayor said, “I don’t believe we should bend the 
Constitution under any circumstance.  It says what it says.  We should do honor to it.”  The White 
House, Blog Post, The President’s Nominee: Judge Sonia Sotomayor (May 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov.Sotomayor/.  This Note explains why the Constitution’s First 
Amendment has been “ben[t]” and significantly weakened by the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Doninger v. Niehoff (527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008)).  
 8. See infra notes 136-221 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 222-227 and accompanying text. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).  At a public rally, Mr. Watts 
commented that if he was forced to join the Army and made to carry a rifle, “the first man I want to 
get in my sights is [President] L.B.J.”  Id. at 706.  Watts was charged with knowingly and willfully 
threatening the President.  Id.  The Court noted that public debates should be uninhibited, robust, 
wide-open, and sometimes consist of vehement, caustic, and unpleasant attacks on public officers.  
Id. at 708.  The Supreme Court found that Watts’ language may have been an offensive opposition 
to the President, but this political hyperbole did not amount to a true threat.  Id. 
 12. Id. at 708.  Lower courts have attempted to pinpoint the exact nature of a true threat.  The 
Sixth Circuit has held that speech constitutes a true threat “if a reasonable person would foresee that 
an objective rational recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a serious 
3
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right to speak true threats, the Supreme Court has carved out an 
entirely different body of First Amendment law for public school 
students. 
A. The Supreme Court and the First Amendment in Public Schools 
The following cases outline which types of student speech the 
Supreme Court has held the First Amendment protects and which it does 
not.  As I will explain, the standard the Supreme Court provides is 
anything but precise.13 
1. Protection of Student Expression 
The first time the First Amendment was recognized to protect 
public school students’ speech was in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.14  There, the West Virginia Board of Education 
required students to “salute” the flag while reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance.15  A group of students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses 
refused to salute on the ground that the flag was an “image” and 
according to their faith, the act of saluting was a forbidden form of 
worship.16  The children were expelled from school, and their parents 
sought an injunction to prevent the state from prosecuting them for 
causing truancy.17  The Court recognized that a school has highly 
discretionary educational functions, but is nonetheless a state actor 
 
expression.”  United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Eighth Circuit set 
forth a multi-factor test to determine how a reasonable person would view the speech, including:  
1) The reaction of those who heard the alleged threat; 2) Whether the threat was 
conditional; 3) Whether the person who made the alleged threat communicated it directly 
to the object of the threat; 4) Whether the speaker had a history of making threats against 
the person purportedly threatened; and 5) Whether the recipient had a reason to believe 
that the speaker had a propensity to engage in violence. 
Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 
United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 13. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 14. See 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1943).   
 15. Id. at 628-29.  The student was expected to “salute” the flag, by keeping his right arm stiff 
with his hand raised, palm facing up.  Id. at 628 (discussing the stiff-arm salute). 
 16. Id. at 629.  The Jehovah’s Witness faith believes in a literal interpretation of Exodus 20:4-
5, which states, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that 
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.”  Id.  Members of this faith consider the American 
flag an “image” within this interpretation and refuse to salute it.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 629-30.  
4
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bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to respect students’ First 
Amendment rights.18 
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
The trend toward greater respect for students’ freedom of speech 
rights continued twenty-six years later when the Supreme Court ruled in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that 
public school officials violated several students’ First Amendment rights 
by suspending them for wearing black armbands to school as a silent 
protest of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.19  The Court began its reasoning 
by stating, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”20  The Court ruled that a school’s fear or 
apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to overcome First 
Amendment rights.21  A school does not have absolute authority over its 
students’ words.22  In order for a school to prohibit speech, it must show 
“that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an 
 
 18. Id. at 637.  Justice Jackson noted that the school’s purpose was to educate the students 
without discounting important constitutional freedoms of the individual and without “strang[ling] 
the free mind at its source.”  Id.  The Court highlighted that freedoms of speech, press, assembly, 
and worship do not depend on the judiciary’s outcome but rather are fundamental rights susceptible 
to restriction only where it would “prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State 
may lawfully protect.”  Id. at 637.  Justice Jackson thought that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”  Id. at 642. 
  What makes this case more applicable to the issue at hand is that the Court noted that even 
though those who refused compliance did so on religious grounds, that fact alone does not control 
the decision.  Id. at 634-35.  While religion supplied the motive in this instance, many citizens who 
have different religious views also have a compulsory right to demand constitutional protection.  Id. 
 19. See 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 20. Id. at 506. 
 21. Id. at 508.  Justice Fortas noted that any departure from the school’s absolute 
regimentation may cause trouble.  Id.  Any deviation from the majority may start an argument or 
disrupt the peace.  Id.  He believed that these risks are substantially outweighed by constitutional 
freedoms.  See id. 
 22. Id. at 511.  The Court stated that regardless of whether a student was in school or out of 
school, they are still “persons” under the Constitution.  Id.  Their comments may not be limited to 
only those that are officially approved.  Id.  School officials cannot suppress speech with which they 
do not agree or do not wish to hear.  See id.  “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of the American schools.”  Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 487 (1960).  The Tinker Court agreed with the Shelton Court that these children are our 
nation’s future and wide exposure to a robust exchange of ideas leaves our future looking much 
brighter than succumbing to authoritative selection.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 
5
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unpopular viewpoint.”23  Tinker sets a very high standard: a student’s 
speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with the school’s 
administrative order to be prohibited.24  The Tinker test is the baseline 
standard most frequently applied to student speech cases.25 
3. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
In 1986, the Supreme Court applied an exception to the Tinker 
standard in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.26  In Bethel, 
Matthew Fraser delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for 
elective office in front of approximately 600 of his high school peers.27  
The speech was part of a school-sponsored assembly.28  During the 
entire speech, Fraser referred to his friend in terms of an elaborate, 
graphic, and sexual metaphor.29  The Court held that “[t]he constitutional 
rights of students in public schools are not automatically co-extensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”30  The Court established a 
balancing test, weighing the freedom of articulating unpopular and 
 
 23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 8-9.  The Supreme Court’s composition at the time of the 
Tinker decision was considered liberal in many respects.  Id.at 9.  It was the same Court responsible 
for desegregating public schools, revolutionizing criminal procedure, and invalidating teacher-led 
prayer in schools.  Id.  The Supreme Court did not again visit student speech cases until the 1980s 
when the Court featured markedly more conservative justices.  Id.  This paradigm shift is one 
possible explanation for the Court beginning to limit Tinker’s scope by creating exceptions.  See 
infra notes 26-46 and accompanying text. 
 26. See 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 677.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  Fraser’s speech: 
  I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm – but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.   
  Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll take 
an issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard, 
pushing and pushing until finally – he succeeds. 
  Jeff is a man who will go to the very end – even the climax, for each and every one 
of you. 
  So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president – he’ll never come between you and the 
best our high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  The next day, Fraser was 
suspended three days for violating the school’s disruptive conduct rule.  Id. at 678. 
 30. Id. at 682.  The Court ruled that it is rightly the school board’s responsibility to make the 
determination of what classroom or class assembly speech is appropriate.   Id. at 683.  The Court 
believed that Fraser’s pervasive sexual innuendo was “plainly offensive” to both students and 
teachers.  Id.  Justice Burger wrote, “[a] high school assembly or classroom is no place for a 
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”  Id. at 
685. 
6
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controversial ideas with society’s countervailing interest of teaching 
students the values of civil discourse and where to draw the line of 
socially appropriate behavior.31  The Court held that in accordance with 
the school’s educational mission to teach manners of civility essential to 
a democratic society, the school may ban “vulgar and lewd speech” that 
would “undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”32   
4. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Less than two years later, the Court added another exception to the 
Tinker standard when it decided Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.33  In Kuhlmeier, a principal objected to publishing a high 
school newspaper that discussed teenage pregnancy and the impact of 
divorce upon teenagers.34  The issue in this case was slightly different 
than those in Tinker and Fraser because it dealt with whether the school 
had to lend its resources to, and affirmatively endorse, the student 
speech with which it disagreed.35  The principal reasoned that because 
the newspaper was part of the curriculum, educators were permitted 
greater deference in determining its contents to assure that the writer’s 
views were not attributed to the school.36  The Court agreed, holding, 
“[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”37 
5. Morse v. Frederick 
The Court did not revisit the extent to which public school students 
enjoy freedom of speech until 2007, when it decided Morse v. 
Frederick.38  The 5-4 decision produced two concurring opinions, one 
concurrence in the judgment and dissent in part, and three dissents, 
 
 31. See id. at 681. 
 32. Id.  The Fraser Court noted a “marked difference” between the political speech in Tinker 
and what it deemed “sexual speech” in Fraser.  Id. at 679. 
 33. See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 34. Id. at 263. 
 35. Id. at 270-71.  By contrast, Tinker addressed when the First Amendment required schools 
to tolerate student speech.  Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the 
First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 367 (2007) (discussing the Kuhlmeier exception). 
 36. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.  The Court stated that a school must be able to take into 
account the intended audience’s emotional maturity when determining whether it is appropriate to 
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics.  Id. at 272. 
 37. Id. at 273.    
 38. See 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
7
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suggesting that the current state of the law is ambivalent at best.39  In 
Morse, school officials allowed students to leave school to watch the 
Olympic Torch Relay pass through their city.40  Once camera crews 
arrived from area news channels, Joseph Frederick and his friends 
unfurled a fourteen-foot banner which read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”41  
When Frederick refused the principal’s request to take the banner down, 
he was subsequently suspended from school for ten days.42  The Court 
declined to apply Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard and instead 
held that “[t]he ‘special circumstances of the school environment’ and 
the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow[s] 
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use.”43  
 
 39. See id. at 404 (acknowledging that the mode of analysis employed in Fraser was not 
entirely clear). 
 40. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. 
CT. REV. 205, 210 (2007).  In 2002, the Winter Olympic Games were held in Salt Lake City, Utah.  
Id.  As per custom, the Olympic Torch is passed from the site of the previous Winter Games to the 
current site.  Id.  On the day in question, the Torch was passing through Juneau, Alaska, where 
Joseph Frederick was then a senior at Juneau-Douglas High School.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
determined that this was a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event because it occurred 
during normal school hours and was sanctioned by Principal Morse as an approved social event.  
Morse, 553 U.S. at 400.  The Court agreed with the school’s superintendent that Frederick cannot 
“stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and 
claim he is not at school.”  Id. at 401. 
 41. Schauer, supra note 40, at 210.  Frederick claimed that the nonsense banner was simply a 
way to appear on television.  Morse, 553 U.S. at 401. 
 42. Morse, 553 U.S. at 396.  The Court believed that although the banner was “cryptic,” it 
was reasonable that the high school principal regarded it as promoting illegal drug use which 
directly conflicted with the established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events.  
Id. at 401.  Frederick appealed his suspension to the Juneau School District Superintendent, who 
described Frederick’s stunt as “a fairly silly message promoting illegal drug usage in the middle of a 
school activity,” but nevertheless, reduced his suspension to eight days.  Schauer, supra note 41, at 
211. 
 43. Morse, 553 U.S. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)).  The Court reasoned that the danger in this case was far more severe than the 
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint” set forth in Tinker.  Id.  The Court felt student drug abuse extends well beyond a 
theoretical desire to avoid controversy.  Id. 
However, the Court was unwilling to accept Morse’s argument that Frederick’s speech should fall 
under the Fraser standard as plainly offensive.  Id.  The Court stated that Fraser should not be 
stretched to prohibit any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.”  Id.  Chief 
Justice Roberts reasoned that most political and religious speech could be offensive to some.  Id.  
The offensiveness of Frederick’s speech was not part of the Court’s concern, but rather, that his 
conduct was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.  Id.  
8
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6. The Supreme Court Standard Summarized 
Commentators greatly anticipated the Morse holding in hopes that 
the Court’s decision would clarify prior Supreme Court precedent, the 
existing precedents’ interrelationship, and the scope of each case.44  The 
decision left commentators disappointed, as the Court declined to 
expand its holding beyond student speech promoting illegal drug use.45  
The Supreme Court left us with a standard that can be illustrated as 
follows: Students retain free speech rights in public schools as long as 
their speech does not amount to a “true threat,” does not create a 
material and substantial disruption of school activities, or that school 
officials can reasonably forecast as creating a substantial disruption, 
unless the student’s speech was vulgar, lewd, or undermined the school’s 
basic educational mission, or unless the speech is of an offensively 
sexual suggestive nature, or unless the speech is school sponsored and 
school officials’ actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns, or unless the speech might reasonably be understood as 
bearing the imprimatur of the school itself, or unless the speech 
advocates illegal drug use.46  This standard is imprecise and unclear.  
The Supreme Court should adopt a standard whereby public school 
students blogging from home computers outside of school hours may 
exercise their First Amendment right to freedom of speech so long as 
their expression does not fall into a previously delineated category of 
unprotected speech.47 
 
 44. Dickler, supra note 35, at 356. 
 45. See Schauer, supra note 40, at 222 (stating that, in granting certiorari to Morse, the 
Supreme Court did not select the most relevant case).  The issue in Morse was unique to that case 
only.  Id.  By selecting a case that was not representative of student speech rights as a whole, the 
Court in effect refused to answer any other of the myriad of student speech issues that are plaguing 
the lower courts, such as Doninger v. Niehoff.  See infra Section III.   
 46. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 553 U.S. 393 (2007). 
Confused?  You are not alone.  The Supreme Court offers lower courts very little guidance.  
Judges, lawyers, teachers, and school administrators are certainly no clearer about the state of the 
law even though the Supreme Court handed down a student speech decision less than two years ago 
in Morse.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (acknowledging that the Court’s earlier standards were not 
entirely clear, but declining to clarify the confusion in order to decide the case at hand). 
 47. Unprotected speech includes: 1) true threats (see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 
(1969); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text); 2) fighting words (see Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, (1942), stating fighting words are “those by which their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and “are of such slight 
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality”); 3) incitement to riot (see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969), holding a State cannot “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
9
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B. The Lower Courts’ Attempts at Creating a Workable Standard for 
Student Speech Originating on the Internet 
The Supreme Court held in Reno v. ACLU (1997) that speech on 
the Internet, as the most participatory form of a mass speech yet 
developed, is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment 
protection.48  The basis of the Court’s holding was that restricting 
indecent adult speech on the Internet to protect minors 
unconstitutionally infringed on an adult’s freedom of speech rights.49  
Never decided by the Supreme Court, lower courts have attempted to 
resolve how student Internet speech fits into the current state of the 
law. 
1. Internet Speech Brought on Campus by the Speaker 
a. J.S.’ Solicitation of a Hitman 
In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, an eighth-grader created 
a website from his home computer titled “Teacher Sux” which listed 
reasons why his algebra teacher should die, showed a drawing with her 
 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action”); 4) libel/defamation (see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), stating that a public official must show that the libelous statement was 
“made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not”); 5) child pornography (see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 
(1982), holding that child pornography may be banned without first being deemed obscene); and 6) 
obscenity (see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973)  (reaffirming that obscene material is 
unprotected by the First Amendment and defining a three part test to determine whether material is 
obscene). 
This suggested standard is lower than that set forth in Tinker, and rightfully so.  The Tinker 
standard was adopted for conduct that occurred on school grounds during school hours.  Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 508.  For more discussion on this standard, see infra Part IV.C.1. 
 48. 521 U.S. 844, 863.  The Communications Decency Act of 1996 made it a crime to 
knowingly transmit obscene or indecent messages to anyone under the age of 18, or to knowingly 
send or display to any person under the age of 18 any message that “depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs.”  Id. at 859-60.  The Court held that the statute was overbroad and that it placed 
an unacceptably heavy burden on free speech.  Id. at 882.  The Court conceded that there is a 
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials, but where the indecent speech 
falls short of obscene, the interest does not justify unnecessarily broad suppression of speech 
addressed to adults.  Id. at 875.   
 49. See id.  Justice Stevens concluded the opinion by stating: 
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 
presume that the governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.  The interest in 
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but 
unproven benefit of censorship. 
Id. at 885. 
10
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head severed and dripping blood from her neck, and solicited twenty 
dollar donations to help pay for a hitman.50  The court considered this to 
be on-campus speech because J.S. accessed the website at school, told 
other students about the website, and showed it to a classmate.51  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the website caused actual and 
substantial disruption of the school’s operations, was the direct and 
indirect impact of the teacher’s emotional injuries, and caused students 
to fear for their safety.52  As a result, J.S.’s permanent expulsion was 
upheld.53 
b. Layshock’s MySpace Parody 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, high school senior 
Justin Layshock created a “MySpace” page54 on his grandmother’s 
home computer posting a picture of his principal complete with 
commentary suggesting the principal was an alcoholic, a drug 
abuser, and a “big fag.”55  Justin informed his friends of this parody, 
and soon much of the student body accessed the page, causing the 
 
 50. 807 A.2d 847, 850-51 (Pa. 2002).  As a result of viewing the website, the algebra teacher 
testified that she feared someone was going to kill her, suffered stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss 
of sleep, weight loss, and a general sense of loss of well-being.  Id. at 852.  She suffered from short-
term memory loss and headaches, was required to take anti-anxiety/anti-depression medication, and 
was unable to converse in crowds.  Id.  The teacher was granted a medical leave for the school year 
causing three substitutes to fulfill her duties which “disrupted the educational process of the 
students.”  Id.  Principal Kartsotis explained that the school’s morale was the lowest he had seen in 
forty years of education – comparable to the death of a student or staff member.  Id. 
 51. Id. at 865.  The court considered there to be a “sufficient nexus” between the website and 
the school to consider the speech as occurring on campus, holding, “[w]here speech that is aimed at 
a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its 
originator, the speech will be considered on-campus.”  Id. 
 52. Id. at 869.  Despite finding the statements regarding solicitation of a hitman and reasons 
why the teacher should die to be stated unconditionally and unequivocally, the court felt they fell 
short of constituting a true threat.  Id. at 859.  The court wrote: 
We believe the website . . . was a sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps 
misguided attempt at humor or parody.  However, it did not reflect a serious expression 
of intent to inflict harm . . . . Distasteful and even highly offensive communication does 
not necessarily fall from First Amendment protection as a true threat simply because of 
its objectionable nature. 
Id. at 859-60.  However, the court found that the website created disorder and significantly and 
adversely impacted education, particularly considering the student and staff’s feeling of 
helplessness and low spirits.  Id. at 869. 
 53. Id. at 847. 
 54. MySpace.com is a website where users can share photos, journals, and personal interests 
with other users who have created profiles.  412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 55. Id. at 505. 
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school to shut down the computer system for five days.56  A federal 
judge denied Justin’s request for a temporary restraining order, 
holding Justin’s actions substantially disrupted school operations 
and interfered with the rights of others.57 
2. Internet Speech Brought on Campus by Another Student 
a. Wisniewski’s Buddy Icon 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central 
School District, eighth-grader Martin Wisniewski created an AOL 
Instant Messenger “buddy icon”58 of a pistol firing a bullet above a 
 
 56. Id. at 508.   The lack of access to the computer system caused the school to cancel several 
classes and students were not able to access the computers for school purposes.  Id. at 508.  The 
school district’s technology coordinator estimated that during this five-day period he spent 25 
percent of his time blocking numerous addresses from which students were attempting to access 
MySpace profiles on school computers and setting up firewalls to prohibit access to the website.  Id.  
The school’s co-principal testified that he dedicated at least 25 to 30 percent of his time dealing with 
the disruptions and investigating the source of the parody.  Id. 
 57. Id.  The court found that Justin’s conduct did not fall within a Tinker exception, so it 
could only be regulated if it substantially disrupted school operations or interfered with the rights of 
others.  Id. at 507.   
Justin was suspended for ten days, placed in the Alternative Curriculum Education Program, 
banned from attending or participating in any school sponsored events, and prohibited from 
attending his graduation ceremony.  Id. at 505.  The court commented that it thought Justin’s 
punishment was extreme, noting, “[a]lthough the punishment inflicted upon Justin for his conduct is 
arguably excessive, the Court is not empowered to second-guess the appropriateness of Defendants’ 
actions absent some underlying violation of his legal rights” and that “in this case the public interest 
is best served by allowing defendants to administer their high school and discipline their students as 
they determine, despite the Court’s reservations regarding the appropriateness of Justin’s 
punishment.”  Id. at 509. 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut (“ACLU-CT”) argued that Justin’s 
punishment should not have been upheld.  Brief of Amicus Curiae,  ACLU of Connecticut, in 
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction , Doninger 
v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter ACLU-CT Brief]. 
[N]either the principal’s distraught reaction, nor the “offensive[ness]” and 
“unpleasantness” of the speech, nor the fact that students had “buzz[ed]” about the 
profile, nor the fact that one computer teacher had threatened to shut down the school’s 
computer system . . . nor the fact that the speech was “rude and demeaning,” could 
persuade a reasonable jury to find the disruption sufficient.  In order for that to happen, 
the disruption would have to be so severe as to cause, or threaten to cause, consequences 
such as class cancellations, widespread disorder, violence, or student disciplinary action, 
or to render teachers “incapable of teaching or controlling their classes.” 
Id. at 10. 
 58. AOL Instant Messenger allows a person to exchange messages in real time with members 
who have the same AOL software on their computer.  494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).  The program enables users to transmit an icon, created by the sender, on 
the computer screen during an IM exchange.  Id. at 36.  The image remains on the screen for the 
duration of the online conversation.  Id. at 35. 
12
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person’s head, complete with splattered blood and the words “Kill Mr. 
VanderMolen,” despite the administration’s warning a few weeks prior 
that threats would be treated as acts of violence and would not be 
tolerated.59  During the three-week period he used the icon, Martin 
chatted with fifteen of his friends.60  When a classmate told Mr. 
VanderMolen of Martin’s icon, the school suspended Martin for a 
semester.61  Given the content of the icon, Martin’s distribution of it, and 
the period of time he used it, the Second Circuit concluded that Martin’s 
conduct crossed the protected student speech boundary, that it posed a 
reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of 
school authorities, and that it materially and substantially disrupted the 
school’s operations.62 
b. Paul’s Top Ten List 
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, high school student 
Zachariah Paul emailed a number of his friends a “Top Ten” list about 
the school’s athletic director, which contained statements about the 
athletic director’s appearance, including the size of his genitals.63  An 
undisclosed student distributed Zachariah’s email on school grounds and 
copies were found in the teachers’ lounge, resulting in Zachariah’s ten-
day suspension.64  The court granted Zachariah’s motion for summary 
judgment because the list was created off school grounds, there was no 
 
 59. Id. at 36. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 39-40.  The court confirmed prior precedent that off-campus conduct could create a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school.  Id. at 39.  In discussing the extent of the 
discipline, the court was mindful that “[i]t is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions 
of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”  
Id. at 40. 
 63. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001).  The list read as follows: 
10) The School Store doesn’t sell twinkies.  9) He is constantly tripping over his own 
chins.  8) The girls at the 900 #’s [sic] keep hanging up on him.  7) For him, becoming 
Franklin’s “Athletic Director” was considered “moving up in the world.”  6) He has to 
use a pencil to type and make phone calls because his fingers are unable to hit only one 
key at a time.  5) As stated in previous list, he’s just not getting any.  4) He is no longer 
allowed in any “All You Can Eat” restaurants.  3) He has constant flashbacks of when he 
was in high school and the athletes used to pick on him, instead of him picking on the 
athletes.  2) Because of his extensive gut factor, the “man” hasn’t seen his own penis in 
over a decade.  1) Even it is [sic] wasn’t for his gut, it would still take a magnifying glass 
and extensive searching to find it. 
Id. at 448. 
 64. Id. at 448-49. 
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evidence that Zachariah brought the list onto school grounds, and the 
school district failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.65 
c. Beussink’s Critical Webpage 
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, high school junior 
Brandon Beussink created a website at home on his personal computer 
which was “highly critical” of Woodland’s administration.66  Brandon 
used vulgar language to convey his opinions and invited readers to 
contact the school’s principal to express their beliefs regarding 
Woodland High School.67  Another student, who found Brandon’s 
website while using Brandon’s home computer, accessed the site at 
school and showed it to the school’s computer teacher.68  Consequently, 
Brandon was suspended ten-days and ordered to shut down his 
website.69  The court granted Brandon a preliminary injunction, finding 
he would likely succeed on the merits because the school’s discipline 
stemmed from him expressing an opinion which upset the 
administration, but fell short of Tinker’s standard of causing a material 
or substantial disruption.70 
 
 65. Id. at 458.  The court noted that the speech at issue was not threatening, and although it 
upset the athletic director, it did not cause any faculty member to take a leave of absence as in J.S.  
Id. at 455.  “Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable 
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.”  Id.  The court agreed with the plaintiff’s 
argument that Zachariah was not engaged in any school activity or associated in any way with his 
role as a student when he compiled the “Top Ten” list.  Id. at 456.  Had he distributed the list 
outside of the school environment, he could not have been punished because the government 
considered the content inappropriate.  Id. at 456-457.  The court followed, “[w]hen school officials 
are authorized to punish only the speech which occurs on school property, the student is free to 
speak his mind when the school day ends” and First Amendment protection “may not be made a 
casualty of the effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us.”  Id. at 457.   
 66. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  Brandon testified that he created the website 
to voice his opinion, never intending it to be accessed or viewed at school.  Id. 
 67. Id.  Brandon’s website contained a hyperlink which allowed the user to access Woodland 
High School’s homepage.  Id.   
 68. Id. at 1177-78.  Brandon allowed a friend, Amanda Brown, to use his home computer.  Id. 
at 1177.  While using the computer, Amanda saw Brandon’s website.  Id.  Brandon and Amanda 
subsequently got into an argument, and in an effort to retaliate, Amanda purposefully accessed 
Brandon’s website at school.  Id. at 1177-78.  Amanda testified that she did not access the website at 
Brandon’s request, with his authorization, or with his knowledge.  Id. at 1178. 
 69. Id. at 1179.  The principal testified that he made the determination to punish Brandon 
immediately upon accessing the website.  Id. at 1180.  The court concluded that this testimony did 
not indicate that the principal disciplined Brandon based on a fear of substantial disruption but 
because he was upset by the website’s content.  Id. 
 70. Id.  The court did not find evidence that Brandon showed the website to other students nor 
that Amanda’s viewing the website at school caused a disturbance.  Id. at 1178-79.  The court 
reasoned that if the threat of punishment remained, Brandon and other students had been effectively 
14
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3. Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach Campus 
a. Mahaffey’s Satanic Support 
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich, high school student Joshua Mahaffey 
created a website entitled “Satan’s web page,” which listed people he 
wished would die and gave readers a murder “mission.”71  A classmate’s 
parent notified the police about the website.72  Although the police did 
not pursue criminal charges, the school district determined the website 
violated the school’s computer use policy.73  The district court found that 
there was no evidence that the website interfered with the school’s 
duties, thus failing the Tinker standard.74 
b. Emmett’s Mock Obituaries  
In Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415, eighteen-year-old high 
school senior Nick Emmett created a webpage containing mock 
 
denied their constitutional right to engage in free speech.  Id. at 1181.  The court emphatically 
noted: 
  One of the core functions of free speech is to invite dispute.  “It may indeed best 
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.  Speech is often provocative and 
challenging.” 
  Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink’s, which is most in 
need of the protections of the First Amendment.  Popular speech is not likely to provoke 
censure.  It is unpopular speech which needs the protection of the First Amendment.  The 
First Amendment was designed for this very purpose. 
Id. at 1181-82 (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).  Likewise, the court 
believed Brandon was punished for speech that was constitutionally protected.  Id. at 1181. 
 71. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002).  Near the bottom of Joshua’s website, the 
page read: 
SATAN’S MISSION FOR YOU THIS  
  WEEK:  Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off of a cliff, 
watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on 
their face.  Killing people is wrong don’t do It.  unless Im there to watch.  Or just go to 
Detroit.  Hell is right in the middle.  Drop by and say hi. 
  PS:  NOW THAT YOU’VE READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON’T GO 
KILLING PEOPLE AND STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME.  OK? 
Id at 781 (all grammatical errors and capitalizations are part of the original). 
 72. Id at 782. 
 73. Id.  According to a police officer’s testimony, Joshua admitted contributing to the website 
and stated that school computers “may have” been used in creating the site.  Id.  The school 
suspended Joshua for his contributions.  Id. 
 74. Id. at 784.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs that school officials had exceeded their 
powers when they punished Joshua for his out of school conduct.  See id.  The court also ruled that 
Joshua’s actions fell short of constituting a “true threat” because there was no evidence Joshua 
communicated the website’s statements to anyone.  Id. at 786.  Likewise, a reasonable person would 
not interpret Joshua’s remarks as intending to harm or kill anyone listed on the website.  Id. at 786. 
15
Hayes: From Armbands to Douchbags
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
FINAL HAYES_MACRO_FINAL FROM EMAIL 1.11.10.DOC 1/25/2010  2:34 PM 
262 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:247 
“obituaries” of two of Nick’s friends.75  When an evening television 
news story featured Nick’s webpage as a “hit list” of people to be killed, 
Nick immediately removed his site from the Internet.76  Nevertheless, 
the next day the principal placed Nick on emergency expulsion.77  The 
district court granted Nick’s motion for a temporary restraining order, 
reasoning that Nick’s speech fell outside of the Fraser and Kuhlmeier 
exceptions because they were not in a school assembly, in a school-
sponsored newspaper, or affiliated with any school project.78  The court 
determined the school district failed to meet Tinker’s substantial 
disruption standard and “[a]lthough the intended audience was 
undoubtedly connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely 
outside of the school’s supervision or control.”79 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Facts 
During the 2006-2007 school year, Avery Doninger was a 16-year-
old junior at Lewis S. Mills High School (“LMHS”).80  As the Junior 
Class Secretary and a member of Student Council,81 Avery was largely 
responsible for coordinating “Jamfest,” an annual “battle of the bands” 
concert held at LMHS.82  Due to the construction of a new auditorium 
and scheduling conflicts, students were concerned Jamfest might have to 
take place in an alternate venue, be postponed from the much anticipated 
April 28, 2007 date, or be cancelled altogether.83  Jamfest had already 
 
 75. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000).  The court emphasized that Nick carried a 
3.95 GPA, was a co-captain of the school’s basketball team, and had no disciplinary history.  Id.  
The webpage also contained commentary on the school’s administration and allowed visitors to vote 
on who would “die” next – that is, who would be the subject of the next mock obituary.  Id.  It was 
modified by disclaimers warning visitors that the site was for entertainment purposes only and was 
not school-sponsored.  Id.  The obituaries were written “tongue-in-cheek,” inspired by a creative 
writing class which assigned students to write their own obituary.  Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  The emergency expulsion was later modified to a five-day short-term suspension.  Id.   
 78. Id.  The court noted that the school failed to present evidence that the mock obituaries and 
voting were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent 
tendencies whatsoever.  Id. at 1090.  This, combined with the speech’s off-campus nature, indicated 
that Nick had a substantial likelihood of success on his claim’s merits.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 1090. 
 80. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (D. Conn. 2007).  The district court 
referred to Avery as “poised, intelligent, and articulate.”  Id. at 202.   
 81. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 82. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
 83. Id. at 203-04.   
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been postponed twice.84  Because the school year was drawing to a 
close, students thought that a later date might not be available, or that 
even if a new date were agreed upon, some of the bands might refuse to 
play, out of frustration.85  In addition, the teacher responsible for 
operating the highly technical light and sound systems in the new 
auditorium was unavailable on April 28, 2007.86   
During the morning of April 24, 2007, Avery and three other 
students sent a mass email to the city’s taxpayers explaining the 
students’ dilemma and asking for their support to convince the 
administration to hold the concert in the school’s auditorium, despite the 
scheduling conflict.87  Around noon the same day, Avery encountered 
Principal Karissa Niehoff, visibly upset, in the hallway.88  Principal 
Niehoff had been called away from her long-scheduled in-service 
training day to respond to the influx of calls and emails received as a 
result of the students’ email.89  Avery claimed that Principal Niehoff told 
her that Jamfest had been cancelled.90  Principal Niehoff testified that 
she told Avery she was disappointed in the students’ decision to send the 
email, but that she was open to rescheduling Jamfest so it could be held 
in the auditorium on a different date.91  Principal Niehoff also testified 
that she told Avery that the students violated the school’s internet policy 
by sending the email.92  Principal Niehoff stated she informed Avery that 
 
 84. Id. at 203. 
 85. Id. at 203-04. 
 86. Id. at 204.  The students later learned that the regional Board of Education policy required 
that particular teacher’s presence at all such events in the new auditorium.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 205.  The parties disagree as to who suggested sending the email.  According to 
Avery, a faculty advisor insinuated that the students explain their situation via a mass email to the 
taxpayers in hopes of enlisting their support.  Id. at 204.  The faculty advisor testified that her 
recommendation was for the students to compile a list of reasons Jamfest should continue as 
planned, which they could present to the school’s administration.  Id.  The other students involved 
presented testimony somewhere between Avery’s and the faculty advisor’s version of events.  Id.  
One student in the group accessed his father’s address book and extracted the majority of the 
addresses for the email.  Id. at 205.  The email explained the Jamfest situation to the taxpayers and 
asked them to contact the central office and to “forward [the email] to as many people as you can.”  
Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  In the defendants’ brief, they argued that both Avery and Lauren Doninger, Avery’s 
mother, signed an Acceptable Use Agreement that stated that the Internet was not to be used for any 
reason other than educational purposes.  Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2007) 
(No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter Opposition to Preliminary Injuction].  The agreement provided, in 
relevant part: “I understand that this access is designed for educational purposes . . . . Should I 
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the students acted in a manner that was inappropriate for class officers.93  
Principal Niehoff was distressed because she and Superintendent 
Schwartz were late to, or forced to miss, several other school-related 
activities scheduled for April 24 and 25, 2007.94  They both received 
“numerous” phone calls and emails from taxpayers.95 
At approximately 9:30 P.M. on April 24, 2007, still upset from her 
conversation with Principal Niehoff, Avery posted an entry to her 
LiveJournal.com96 blog from her home computer which referred to the 
administration as “douchebags” and suggested she would support her 
readers if they wrote Superintendent Schwartz or “call[ed] her to piss her 
off more.”97   
The next morning, April 25, 2007, Principal Niehoff and 
Superintendent Schwartz continued receiving phone calls and emails 
regarding Jamfest.98  The same four students who signed the taxpayer 
email met with Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz to talk 
about scheduling the concert at a later date.99  Principal Niehoff asked 
 
commit any violation, of said policy or corresponding procedures and guidelines, my access 
privileges may be revoked, and school disciplinary action as deemed appropriate by the 
administration and/or appropriate legal action may be taken.”  Id. 
 93. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
 94. Id. at 206.   
 95. Id. 
 96. LiveJournal.com is “[a] blogging platform and online community built around personal 
journals.”  LiveJournal Inc. – About Us, http://www.livejournalinc.com/aboutus.php (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2008).  A visitor need not be registered to view other user’s blogs unless the user has 
adjusted her privacy settings to restrict access.  Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206.  On April 24, 
2007 Avery’s blog setting was “public.”  Id.  LiveJournal.com is a website unaffiliated with LMHS.  
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 97. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45.  Avery’s LiveJournal blog stated: 
  jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office.  here is an email that we 
sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book to 
help get support for jamfest.  basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting 
a TON of phone calls and emails and such.  we have so much support and we really 
appriciate it.  however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing all 
together.  anddd so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance 
we do it is going to be after the talent show on may 18th.  andd..here is the letter we sent 
out to parents.  [The entry then reproduced the email from earlier in the day.]   
  And here is a letter my mom sent to Paula and cc’d Karissa to get an idea of what to 
write if you want to write something or call her to piss her off more.  im down.-- 
Id.  (all misspellings and grammatical errors are part of the original blog post).  Avery then 
reproduced an email Ms. Doninger had sent Superintendent Schwartz earlier in the day.  Id.  Several 
LMHS students commented on Avery’s blog post, including one student who referred to 
Superintendent Schwartz as a “dirty whore.”  Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207.   
 98. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45. 
 99. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207.  Also present at the meeting were the students’ faculty 
advisor, the teacher in charge of the highly technical light and sound system, and the building and 
grounds supervisor.  Id.  None of the staff present knew of Avery’s blog post at the meeting.  Id.  
18
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the students to send out a clarifying email.100  She further spoke to the 
students about the proper role of student officers and how they should 
resolve such issues in the future, making it clear that mass emails to 
taxpayers were not acceptable.101 
It was not until May 7, 2007 that the administration found out about 
Avery’s blog post.102  On May 17, 2007, Avery was called into Principal 
Niehoff’s office and asked to do three things: (1) apologize to 
Superintendent Schwartz; (2) show the post to her mother; and (3) 
withdraw from running for Senior Class Secretary.103  Avery performed 
the first two, but refused to withdraw and subsequently won a plurality 
of the votes by virtue of a write-in campaign.104  Nonetheless, Avery was 
not permitted to serve as Senior Class Secretary.105  Principal Niehoff 
 
The administrators offered the students the option of holding Jamfest in the cafeteria on April 28, 
2007, or in the auditorium at a later date.  Id.  The students chose the latter.  Id.  Jamfest was 
successfully held in the auditorium on June 8, 2007, and all but one of the bands participated.  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46.  According to Superintendent Schwartz’s testimony, she alerted 
Principal Niehoff of Avery’s blog post after her adult son found it while using an internet search 
engine.  Id. 
 103. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207.  Principal Niefhoff testified that her decision was based 
on Avery’s blatant disregard of Principal Niehoff’s suggestion regarding the proper means of 
expressing disagreement with the school’s administration and also because the post used vulgar 
language and inaccurate information.  Id. at 208.  Additionally, Principal Niehoff did not think it 
appropriate of a class officer to encourage taxpayers to contact the central office “to piss 
[Superintendent Schwartz] off more.”  Id.  There was a factual dispute as to whether Principal 
Niehoff permitted Avery to maintain her position as Junior Class Secretary.  Id.  Again, the court 
adopted Principal Niehoff’s testimony that Avery was permitted to finish her term.  Id. 
  Six days later, Avery wrote her apology to Superintendent Schwartz, stating: “Please 
accept my apology for the tone and language of the Live Journal entry that I posted on April 24th.”  
Id.  It is undisputed that Avery also showed her blog to Ms. Doninger.  See id. (stating Ms. 
Doninger emailed Principal Niehoff and referred to Avery’s blog as “offensive” but urged that 
Avery’s punishment was “an over reaching response with enormous consequences” and begged for 
a more appropriate punishment). 
 104. Id. at 208.  Class elections were held on May 25, 2007.  Id.  One of Avery’s friends made 
t-shirts in her honor that read “Team Avery” on the front and “Support LSM Freedom of Speech” 
on the back and passed them out to a group of students.  Id.  Avery wore a t-shirt that said “R.I.P. 
Democracy.”  Id.  Principal Niehoff prevented the students wearing the “Team Avery” shirts from 
hearing the candidacy speeches unless they removed their t-shirts, stating it was not her intention 
“to permit electioneering materials of any kind into the auditorium for the election assembly” on the 
grounds that it might unfairly prejudice the students who did not have the same resources.  Id. 
 105. Id. at 209.  In an email to Ms. Doninger, Principal Niehoff reasoned, “Avery received a 
consequence because she posted the extremely disrespectful blog despite previous conversations 
with her addressing the Jamfest event, the use of the auditorium, and appropriate conduct as a class 
officer.”  Id.  
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explicitly denied that the email from April 24, 2007 was the basis of any 
disciplinary action.106 
B. Competing Arguments 
1. Avery’s Argument 
Avery argued that the administration violated her First Amendment 
rights when they prevented her from running for Senior Class Secretary 
and when they did not permit her to wear a “Team Avery” t-shirt into the 
auditorium on May 25, 2007.107  She contended that because her blog 
post took place within the confines of her home, the administration 
reached beyond its authority in disciplining Avery.108  In light of the 
“equities tipping sharply in [her] favor” and the administration’s 
persistent violation of Avery’s constitutional rights, Doninger contended 
a temporary injunction should be granted in order to prevent future 
irreparable harm.109 
2. Administration’s Argument 
Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz argued that Avery 
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because she had no “right” to 
 
 106. Id.  The district court credited Principal Niehoff’s testimony because none of the other 
three students who signed the Jamfest email made blog posts similar to Avery’s.  Id.  As such, the 
other students did not receive any disciplinary action and were permitted to run for class officer and 
Student Council.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 211.  The complaint also alleged that the school’s administration denied Avery’s 
First Amendment protection when she was not permitted to give a speech during the class elections 
held on May 25, 2007.  Id.  The court considered this sanction to be synonymous with the school 
preventing Avery from running for Senior Class Secretary for purposes of its analysis.  Id.  The 
court did not consider any First Amendment claims relating to the students’ Jamfest email.  Id. 
  Doninger’s attorney also argued that balancing the relative harms easily justified granting 
a temporary injunction because without it, she would continue to be deprived of her fundamental 
right to Freedom of Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process.  Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction at 15, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 
(D. Conn. July 26, 2007) (No. 3:07- cv-1129) [hereinafter Application for Temporary Injunction].  
In contrast, if a temporary injunction was granted, the defendants’ only “hardship” would be 
holding another election for Senior Class Secretary and allowing Avery the opportunity to give a 
speech to her class.  Id.  According to Attorney Schoenhorn, “[b]asically, [the injunction] requires 
the defendants to start obeying the law – a burden that should not be onerous to them.”  Id.  
 108. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008).  Avery maintained that her blog did 
not contain “fighting words,” “true threats,” or other exceptions to her absolute right to free speech.  
Application for Temporary Injunction, supra note 107, at 5. 
 109. Application for Temporary Injunction, supra note 107, at 5; see also infra note 115 
(listing the elements of a preliminary injunction). 
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serve as a class secretary.110  Further, the administrators alleged that 
Avery could not demonstrate the likelihood of success on the case’s 
merits because their actions did not violate Avery’s constitutional 
rights.111  As such, the defendants explained that Avery’s motion for 
temporary injunction should be denied.112 
C. Procedural History 
Lauren Doninger filed an action against Karissa Niehoff and Paula 
Schwartz in Connecticut Superior Court on Avery’s behalf.113  The 
complaint alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and analogous clauses 
of the Connecticut Constitution.114  Doninger sought a preliminary 
injunction115 asking the court to void the election for Senior Class 
 
 110. Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 92, at 14.  Defendants argued that 
participation in extracurricular activities, such as student council and athletics, as per the Board of 
Education policy, is a privilege, not a right.  Id. at 15.  The Board policy states: 
All students elected student officers, or who represent their schools in extracurricular 
activities, shall have and maintain good citizenship records.  Any student who does not 
maintain a good citizenship record shall not be allowed to represent fellow students nor 
the schools for a period of time recommended by the student’s principal . . . . 
Id. at 14. 
 111. Id. at 17.  Specifically, the defendants argued the following: 1) Avery’s speech did not 
deal with a matter of public concern and therefore is not constitutionally protected speech; 2) 
Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz did not violate Avery’s right to free speech because 
the speech was antithetical to the mission of Regional School District #10, vulgar, and knowingly 
false; 3) it was reasonable for the defendants to believe that the speech at issue would cause 
disruption; 4) Avery was not given consequences because of her speech’s content, but because her 
conduct caused disruption; 5) pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 
Avery’s speech is not constitutionally protected; 6) the defendants did not violate Avery’s right to 
free speech when they requested the t-shirts not be worn to a school assembly; 7) the defendants did 
not violate Avery’s right to Due Process; 8) the defendants did not violate Avery’s right of Equal 
Protection; and 9) the Connecticut Constitution does not provide greater free speech protection than 
the United States Constitution regarding student speech.  See Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, 
supra note 92. 
 112. Id. at 40. 
 113. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46-47.  
 114. Id.  Ms. Doninger alleged violations of Avery’s Freedom of Speech rights under the 
United States Constitution’s First Amendment, her Due Process and Equal Protection rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and asserted a cause of action under state tort law for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress.  Id.  
 115. To obtain a preliminary injunction, “[a] plaintiff must establish the following: (1) 
irreparable harm; and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships 
tipping decidedly in her favor.”  Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10.  Irreparable harm is 
established any time there is a First Amendment violation.  Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Id.  “There are no de 
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Secretary, remove the student now serving as class secretary, hold a new 
election in which Avery could run, and to permit Avery, as an elected 
class officer, to speak at the 2008 commencement ceremony.116  The 
defendants removed the action to federal court.117 
1. United States District Court for the District of Connecticut’s 
Decision 
The district court noted that this case was different from both 
Tinker and Fraser because the punishment terminated Avery’s 
participation in voluntary, extracurricular activities.118  The court 
thought the case was closer to Fraser,119 but did not believe that it 
should determine whether disqualifying Avery from running for class 
secretary was a “fitting punishment” under the circumstances because 
that was for school officials to decide.120  The court established that the 
only issue at stake was whether Avery had shown a substantial 
likelihood of succeeding in her claim that the defendants’ actions 
violated her constitutional rights.121  The court ruled that Avery had not 
satisfied that burden.122  In so reasoning, the district court acknowledged 
 
minimis violations of the Constitution – no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are obliged 
to ignore them.”  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2004). 
 116. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 47.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction argued a basis for a temporary 
injunction spanning fourteen paragraphs.  Application for Temporary Injunction and Order to Show 
Cause at 1, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. July 26, 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129) 
[hereinafter Application for Temporary Injunction] (essentially plaintiff requested the district court 
to bar defendants from continuing to violate Avery’s First Amendment right to Freedom of Speech, 
her right to Equal Protection, and her right to Due Process).  
 117. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 47. 
 118. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007).  The court commented 
that Avery’s education was not impeded by her punishment and that she did not have a First 
Amendment right to “run for a voluntary extracurricular position as a student leader while engaging 
in uncivil and offensive communications regarding school administrators.”  Id. at 216. 
 119. Id. at 216. 
 120. Id. at 202.  The district court reasoned:  
It may well be that a more relaxed or more self-assured administration would have let the 
incident pass without declaring [the student] ineligible [to run for class office], and 
perhaps that is what this administration ought to have done; it is not for us to say.  Such a 
question, we believe, represents a judgment call best left to the locally elected school 
board, not to a distant, life-tenured judiciary.   
See id. (quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 121. Id. at 202. 
 122. Id.  The court assured that there were no villains in this case.  Id. at 203.  The judges 
believed Avery to be a good student and the defendants were not “tyrants bent on curbing the 
constitutional rights of all who criticize them.”  Id.   
  The court determined that neither Doninger’s application of the Tinker standard, nor the 
defendants’ application of the Fraser standard provided the appropriate framework in the case at 
hand.  Id. at 213.  The court adopted the position of other circuits by affording great discretion to 
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that school officials have a difficult task of balancing the importance of 
teaching children to think critically with the values of civil discourse.123  
The court was uncertain whether the administration struck the right 
balance in this instance, but was confident that the Constitution did not 
forbid the action they chose.124 
2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Avery 
failed to make an appropriate showing on both her First Amendment and 
Equal Protection claims, although it did so on different grounds.125  The 
court was unclear whether Fraser applied to off-campus speech, but 
concluded that the Tinker standard was adequately established.126  The 
Second Circuit recognized the lack of Supreme Court guidance of a 
school’s authority to regulate off-campus speech.127  While the court 
may not have agreed with her punishment, it concluded that it was not 
authorized to intervene absent “violations of specific constitutional 
guarantees.”128   
 
school administrators in deciding whether a student is eligible to participate in extracurricular 
activities, holding “participation in extracurricular activities . . . is a privilege, not a right.”  Id. at 
214 (quoting Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsey, Education Law 4.05[1], at 4-20 to 4-21) 
(citing Felton v. Fayette Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding summary judgment in 
favor of school district because student had violated school’s good citizenship rule in stealing auto 
parts while participating in the school’s off-campus special vocational program)). 
 123. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 202.   
 124. Id.   
 125. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 126. Id. at 50.  Therefore, the court did not decide the extent of Fraser: “We therefore need not 
decide whether other standards may apply.”  Id.  However, because the Second Circuit declined to 
decide Avery’s case under a Fraser standard, the court may have “intended to gently telegraph to 
the [district court] that it erred in its analysis of Fraser.  Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 
221 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 127. Doninger, 527 F.3d  at 48.  In the 40 years since the Tinker decision, there have been only 
three Supreme Court cases dealing with a student’s right to free speech, despite significantly more 
litigation in the lower courts on this subject.  See Hazelwood School Dist. No. 403 v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. 
Frederick, 553 U.S. 393 (2007).  The Second Circuit has previously held that a student may be 
disciplined for expressive conduct, even if the speech occurred off school grounds, when the 
conduct “would create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment” provided it 
was foreseeable that the expression might make its way onto campus.  Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. 
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 
(U.S. 2008) (following the Tinker standard).  The court followed this reasoning in holding that 
Avery’s conduct posed a substantial risk that LMHS administrators would further be diverted from 
their core educational responsibilities in order to repel incessant emails and phone calls.  Doninger, 
527 F.3d at 51-52. 
 128. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 54. 
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3. Reaching the Merits 
It was not until January 2009 that the district court decided both 
parties’ motions for summary judgment.129  The defendants argued that 
they were entitled to summary judgment because of the court rulings at 
the preliminary injunction hearing.130  Avery contended that she was 
entitled to a trial on her First Amendment claims because of new 
evidence refuting the Second Circuit’s analysis.131  The district court 
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Avery’s blog 
entry First Amendment claim, Equal Protection claim, and Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.132  The court denied defendants’ 
motion for Avery’s First Amendment t-shirt claim.133  Avery’s motion 
for summary judgment was denied.134  It is important to note that the 
district court may have hedged its ruling of the preliminary injunction 
hearings, noting that current First Amendment jurisprudence needed 
 
 129. See Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
 130. Id. at 218. 
 131. Id.  Avery also thought there was conflicting evidence which could show that she was 
punished simply because Principal Niehoff found her blog offensive.  Id.  Avery’s attorney argued 
that the defendants “may have perpetuated a fraud upon this court and continue to do so by asserting 
facts that are clearly untrue.”  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Objection to Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 1, Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2008) 
(No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter Objection to Summary Judgment].  Among other things, this Memo 
points to newly discovered emails in which Principal Niehoff states she has “no problem being the 
bad guy” and that she does not care that she must miss a health seminar.  Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d 
at 218.     
 132. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 221, 224, 230.  The court believed that the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity as to Avery’s blog entry First Amendment claim because even courts 
and legal scholars could not distinguish the contours of student Internet speech protection.  Id. at 
224.  It was unreasonable to expect school officials to predict where the line would be drawn in this 
new technological era.  Id..  Avery’s Equal Protection and Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress claims are not considered in this Note. 
 133. Id. at 226-27.  The court pointed to a factual dispute that would permit a reasonable jury 
to conclude that Principal Niehoff may or may not have “chilled” Avery’s speech in forbidding 
students to wear “Team Avery” t-shirts to the student class officer elections.  Id. at 226. 
 134. Id. at 219.  Even in the light most favorable to Avery, the court was “unconvinced that this 
new evidence, without more, creates a genuine issue of material fact.  Although there may be a 
factual dispute about whether the blog entry was false, there was no doubt that it was misleading.”  
Id.  According to the court, Avery’s blog suggested that Jamfest was cancelled entirely, when there 
was conflicting evidence whether the students were given the option to reschedule the concert in the 
auditorium at a later date.  Id.  The court also noted that it denied Avery’s preliminary injunction 
based on the fact that Avery’s punishment may have been, in part, because her blog entry was 
offensive and uncivil.  Id. at 219.  The court continued this rationale in denying Avery’s motion for 
summary judgment because “school administrators may have multiple motivations for their actions.  
It is possible that Ms. Niehoff was motivated both by the potential for disruption and by the 
offensive nature of the blog entry.”  Id. at 220. 
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much evolution because “the contours of the law in this area are still 
unclear.”135 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Doninger Courts Misinterpreted Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has not yet provided the necessary guidance to 
decide student cyberspeech cases.136  All four of the cases the Court 
decided deal with speech occurring on-campus (Tinker and Fraser) or 
during a school-sanctioned activity off-campus (Kuhlmeier and Morse).  
Avery’s speech is far different because it originated in her own home 
outside of school hours, thus lacking a geographical nexus to the school.  
There is a seeming disconnect between the student expression and any 
actual disruption to the classroom.137  Many lower courts apply ad hoc 
tests in hopes of striking an adequate balance between: (1) a school’s 
legitimate and compelling interests in ensuring the safety of both the 
student body and the educational process, and (2) allowing kids to be 
kids – managing students’ rising use of the Internet as a medium to 
convey their often immature and incoherent speech, which may lash out 
at school administrators, teachers, and peers (in hardly the most 
sophisticated of ways).138  Because there is no more applicable standard, 
the legal standard most scholars employ is Tinker’s material or 
substantial disruption, unless the speech is indecent, lewd, vulgar, or 
 
 135. Id. at 223-24. 
 136. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008).  “The Supreme Court has yet to 
speak on the scope of a school’s authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur 
on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event.”  Id.  The Second Circuit noted that they have 
visited this issue before when deciding that a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct off 
school grounds when this conduct “‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within 
the school environment’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression 
might also reach campus.”  Id. (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (U.S. 2008)).  Here, the court 
observed the need to “draw a clear line between student activity that ‘affects matter[s] of legitimate 
concern to the school community,’ and activity that does not.”  Id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in the 
result). 
 137. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Dunwoody Distinguished Lecture in Law: Student Speech Rights 
in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (Dec. 2008) (implying there is too attenuated of a 
link to draw a causal correlation between student speech occurring off-campus and disruption within 
the school). 
 138. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School 
Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1206, 1226-27 (2008) (discussing that the Tinker standard in regards to student cyberspeech cases 
and arguing that it is “the wrong tool for the wrong job”).   
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plainly offensive (Fraser exception), school-sponsored (Kulhmeier 
exception), or can be seen as promoting illegal drug use (Morse 
exception).139 
1. Avery’s Speech Did Not Fall within a Tinker Exception, so 
Tinker Should Have Controlled 
The Kuhlmeier and Morse exceptions can quickly be rejected as 
irrelevant to Avery’s case because her speech was not school-sponsored; 
it occurred in her free time from her home computer,140 and it was not 
drug related.141  The Fraser exception is more difficult to dispel.  In 
deciding the Doninger case, the Second Circuit failed to rely on the 
Fraser exception because it believed the Fraser standard to be unclear 
as to whether it applies to off-campus speech.142  Even though the court 
dismissed the Fraser exception as inapplicable, it seemed to focus 
primarily on the content of Avery’s post.143  Specifically, the nature of 
 
 139. See Dickler, supra note 35, at 369 (discussing the doctrinal uncertainty in the wake of the 
Tinker trilogy).  See also Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48 (stating the standard to be applied is that “school 
administrators may prohibit student expression that will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the 
work and disciple of the school,’” unless: (1) the speech is “vulgar or offensive” because school’s 
have a duty to “teach[] students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,” (2) educators’ 
interests are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” in “exercis[ing] editorial 
control over school-sponsored expressive activities such as school publications or theatrical 
productions,” or unless (3) the school is “tak[ing] steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care 
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”).  The Second Circuit 
agreed that the Tinker test was the correct standard in deciding Avery’s case, holding, “[b]ecause 
Avery’s blog post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at LMHS, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion.”  Doninger, 527 F.3d at 43. 
 140. See Hazlewood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007). 
 141. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.  See also supra note 45 (discussing the limitations of the 
Morse holding). 
 142. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49.  The court said that it need not determine Fraser’s scope 
because it was uncertain whether Fraser applied to off-campus speech.  Id.  The court noted: 
If Avery had distributed her electronic posting as a handbill on school grounds, this case 
would fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s precedents recognizing that the nature of 
a student’s First Amendment rights must be understood in the light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment and that, in particular, offensive forms of 
expression may be prohibited. 
Id.  The Second Circuit believed that had Avery’s comments occurred in the classroom, Fraser 
would certainly apply because there is nothing in the First Amendment that prohibits school 
authorities from discouraging inappropriate conduct in the school environment.  Id. 
 143. See id. at 49-51.  For example, the court noted: (1) “she called school administrators 
‘douchebags’ and encouraged others to contact Schwartz ‘to piss her off more’ – contain[ing] the 
sort of language that properly may be prohibited in schools.”  Id. at 49. (2) Avery’s language was 
“plainly offensive ,” “vulgar,” and “potentially incendiary.”  Id. at 50-51. 
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her conduct was discussed on eleven pages of the Second Circuit’s 21-
page decision,144  prompting one commentator to note: 
The word “offensive” was used on nine occasions and appeared on 
five pages in the opinion; the word “vulgar” was used seven times and 
appeared on five pages; the word “civility” was used [four] times and 
appeared on four pages; the word “values” was used five times and 
appeared on four pages; and the specific “offensive” phrases used by 
Doninger (“douchebag” and “pissed off”) were reiterated on nine 
separate occasions, appearing on six pages of the opinion.145 
That is an inordinate amount of time spent discussing what the 
Second Circuit deemed legally irrelevant, or at the very least, tangential 
to the principal legal analysis.146  However, the Second Circuit 
deliberately indicated its reliance on Tinker.147 
2. The Doninger Court’s Disapproval of Avery’s Speech Motivated 
its Rulings: Avery’s Conduct Failed to Meet Tinker’s Material 
and Substantial Disruption Standard Required to Regulate her 
Speech 
The Second Circuit relied on three factors in determining that 
Avery’s blog foreseeably created a risk of substantial disruption within 
the school environment.148  First, the language Avery used to express her 
displeasure with the school’s administration was “not only plainly 
offensive, but also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing 
controversy.”149   
What the court appeared to pay little regard was that this speech 
came from a sixteen-year-old high school junior, not a member of the 
Peace Corps.  The court’s reasoning is extreme and a bit out of touch 
 
 144. Nicole Black, Commentary: Offensive Criticism Trumps First Amendment Rights, DOLAN 
MEDIA NEWSWIRES: THE DAILY RECORD OF ROCHESTER, June 21, 2008 (discussing the Second 
Circuit decision in Doninger opens the door to the conclusion that any off-campus criticism of 
school administrators having the potential to cause a disruption on campus may result in school 
discipline).  Nicole Black is an attorney for Fiandach & Fiandach and co-author of Criminal Law in 
New York, a West-Thompson treatise.  Id. 
 145. Id.  Black wrote that she could not help but wonder whether the disrespectful nature of 
Avery’s comments was “the driving force behind the court’s decision in this matter.”  Id.   
 146. Id.  See also supra note 139 (discussing the principal legal approach a majority of courts 
utilize in resolving these claims). 
 147. See Donniger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 148. Id.   
 149. Id. at 50-51.  The court remarked that her chosen words “were hardly conducive to 
cooperative conflict resolution.”  Id. 
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with the current makeup of high school students’ vocabulary.150  High 
school students constantly subject the English language to continual 
transformation.  “Bad” means good.  “Retarded” no longer means having 
a mental handicap.  “Gay” rarely means to be deliriously happy nor does 
it refer to a person’s sexuality.151  “We no longer live in a literal world 
where words have one, single, tightly bound definition.”152   
Moreover, Avery’s online journal was not a place she should have 
been concerned with “resolv[ing] the ongoing controversy,”153 but rather 
existed as a forum for her to vent and allow her peers to comment just 
the same as young people have been doing for generations.154  In past 
 
 150. Posting of Mitchell H. Rubenstein to Adjunct Law Prof Blog: Law Review Ideas, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/law_review_ideas (May 30, 2008) (discussing the 
Second Circuit decision in Donniger  as a major student First Amendment decision involving 
blogs). 
[T]his was a good student.  She had a disagreement with the school and used the word 
[douchebag] . . . . The speech was off campus and the speaker was a high school student.  
This is exactly what the First Amendment protects.  If this type of speech is not 
protected, then what type of speech will be protected?  Is a student limited to merely 
saying “I disagree” or “please Mr. [P]rincipal, change your mind[?]”  Is the problem 
with the speech here that the word [douchebag] was used?  If so, then the court is 
completely out of touch [with] how students and others (lawyers too) talk to one another.  
Was there a real threat of disruption?  I think not. 
Id. 
 151. Besides meaning “homosexual” and “deliriously happy,” gay is also used as an adjective 
to describe what the speaker feels is “stupid” or “lame.”  See Adam Sherwin, Gay Means Rubbish, 
Says BBC, TIMES ONLINE, June 6, 2006, at http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
arts_and_entertainment/article671972.ece (complaining of the word’s use among British 
schoolchildren).   
    UrbanDictionary.com is a website consisting of slang terminology whereby users submit their 
own definitions of a word and other users vote on its accuracy.  The top definition for the word 
“gay” provides the following explanation: “often used to describe something stupid or unfortunate . 
. . [For example,] ‘Man these seats are gay.  I can’t even see what is going on!’”  Urban Dictionary: 
Gay, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=gay (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). 
 152. Posting of Franz Douskey to The Cool Justice Report, http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/ 
2007/09/douskeys-douche-bag-retrospective.html (Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing how elders should lead 
by example in teaching compassion and patience toward our nation’s youth).  “Occasionally, I hear 
someone call someone else a douchebag.  Usually it means how could that person do something so 
stupid.  People laugh over it.  Just like when people call each other schmucks, or pantloads, or 
jerkoffs.”  Id. 
The top Urban Dictionary.com definition for the word “douchebag” is “[s]omeone who has 
surpassed the levels of jerk and asshole.”  Urban Dictionary: douchebag, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=douchebag (last visited June 22, 2009).  While 
this is hardly a scholarly website, it shows that the phrase is not limited to a literal translation. 
 153. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (quoting the court’s disdain of Avery’s word choice). 
 154. See Papandrea, supra note 137 at 1037.  “Although social networks, blogs, and text 
messaging are relatively new technologies, what young people do with them is . . . not that much 
different from what prior generations did without technology.”  Id. at 1036.  Much of this litigation 
involving student speech on the Internet is the same quite harmless and at worst tasteless expression 
that went unpunished when young people voiced their opinions using diaries, landline phones, pig 
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decades, such displeasure would be voiced on the phone, in a diary, or in 
person.155  This is the first generation to rely so heavily upon the Internet 
to keep in contact with one another.  Although to these students it may 
seem like a private method of communicating, it is capable 
disseminating ideas to an unimaginably broader audience than any 
previous form of communication.  Should all student blogs be subjected 
to the same scrutiny as Avery’s?  Imagine the ramifications.156 
 
Latin, or gossiping at the soda shop.  Id. at 1036-37.  “Students are going to be talking about their 
teachers and their classmates anyway; now they are simply using digital media to do it.”  Id. at 
1093.  “Indeed, members of the Court have pointedly noted that the expression at issue [in student 
speech cases, generally] would be plainly protected had it occurred in the fabled town square.”  Id. 
at 1089. 
 155. See Nicole Black, Muzzling Minor Dissent, DOLAN MEDIA NEWSWIRES: THE DAILY 
RECORD OF ROCHESTER, March 10, 2008.  Nicole acknowledged that “[t]he blog post in question 
certainly is not a shining example of the diplomatic use of terminology,” while pointing out that 
“[t]he method of delivery . . .  is irrelevant, and the advent of new ways of communicating should 
not alter this conclusion.  A blog post is no different than the use of a megaphone or mass mailing.”  
Id.  She also echoed Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s remarks during the Second Circuit’s oral arguments 
of the Doninger case, “[p]edagogical rights can’t supersede the rights of students off campus to 
have First Amendment rights.”  Id. 
 156. See Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1030 (permitting school authorities to restrict student 
Internet speech expands their authority in a way previously unthinkable, thus exceeding Tinker’s 
scope and interfering with free speech rights outside the schoolhouse gate). 
  See also Posting of Lauren Doninger (Avery’s mother) to The Cool Justice Report, 
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2007/05/tin-horn-dictatorship-buries-write-in.html (May 30, 2007) 
(discussing that LMHS should take pride in having produced students who are active in the 
democratic process and willing to protest).  Ms. Doninger argued that students at LMHS are 
required to take a civics class with a course description which states, “this required course is 
designed to provide our students with a practical knowledge and understanding of our American 
Government . . . students [will] reconnect with democratic behaviors and institutions as citizens of 
the United States.”  Id.  Ms. Doninger asserted that these lessons become “meaningless when basic 
democratic principles are abandoned by the school administrators who have treated the First 
Amendment rights of [LMHS] students with disdain.”  Id.  Avery’s mother believed that the email 
her daughter and three other students sent to taxpayers was a polite and well-written way to solicit 
help from parents which was in accordance with LMHS’s published mission to “encourage 
creativity, initiative, and problem solving.”  Id.  Based on Ms. Doninger’s interactions with the 
administration, she gathered that Avery was withdrawn from the Senior Class Secretary Election 
because of a “failure of citizenship.”  Id.  She asked her readers, “[i]s everyone who has mouthed 
off in frustration a bad citizen?”  Id. 
  Avery weighed in on Principal Niehoff’s accusation that she failed at citizenship: 
I believe in democracy.  I believe in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  I believe 
that each citizen is responsible for participating in the maintenance of democracy by 
challenging government officials when they overreach.  The principal accused me of 
failing to be a good citizen.  I disagree.  Apathy and passivity are poor citizenship.  
Rallying students and the community to petition the government is good citizenship.  I 
failed at vocabulary, not citizenship.  However, the First Amendment does not limit 
protection to those with sophisticated vocabularies (though I will not make the error of 
rudeness again). 
Posting of Avery Doninger to The Cool Justice Report,  
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Second, the court argued that, “Avery’s post used . . . ‘at best 
misleading and at wors[t] false’ information that Jamfest had been 
cancelled in her effort to solicit more calls and emails to Schwartz.”157  
The students were agitated and a sit-in was threatened because they 
feared that Jamfest would be cancelled.158  Principal Niehoff and 
Superintendent Schwartz received an increase in calls and emails, 
causing them to be late to or miss school-related activities.159  Avery and 
the other students who sent the email to the taxpayers missed class 
because of the need to manage the growing dispute.160  The court held 
that “Avery’s conduct posed a substantial risk that LMHS administrators 
and teachers would be further diverted from their core educational 
responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or confusion 
over Jamfest’s purported cancellation.”161  In a footnote, the Second 
Circuit maintained that the test to be applied for expression that had 
already been disseminated to other students was whether school officials 
“might reasonably portend disruption.”162  As such, the court expressly 
rejected Doninger’s argument that the disruption may have stemmed 
from the mass email of April 24, rather than Avery’s posting, on the 
grounds that actual disruption is not required.163 
The court opinions do not indicate that the defendants ever offered 
proof that the influx of calls to Principal Niehoff and Superintendent 
Schwartz were a result of Avery’s blog.  While the court argued that all 
that is required is for school officials to reasonably portend disruption, 
 
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/making-world-safe-for-douche-bags.html (May 30, 2008) 
(emphasis added) (discussing the importance of defending civil liberties and having leaders 
challenge unconstitutional practices).  It sounds as though this teenager has pegged what the Second 
Circuit failed to distinguish, the difference between “shouldn’t have said” and “didn’t have a right 
to say.”  See id.   
  According to Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George Washington University, the 
Second Circuit got this decision all wrong, stating, “[t]he continual expansion of the authority of 
school officials over student speech teaches a foul lesson to these future citizens.  I would prefer 
some obnoxious speech than teaching students that they must please government officials if they 
want special benefits or opportunities.”  Posting of Steve Collins to BristolToday.com, 
http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-under-scrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27, 
2009, 16:37 EST).   
 157. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (quoting the lower court’s decision). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  The court reasoned that it was foreseeable “that school operations might well be 
disrupted further by the need to correct misinformation as a consequence of Avery’s post.”  Id. 
 161. Id. at 51-52. 
 162. Id. at 52 n.3 (citing Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) 
and relying on prior precedent, Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (U.S. 2008)). 
 163. Id. at 51. 
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there is no indication that the school received, or would receive in the 
future, any calls from Avery’s post.  Likewise, LiveJournal.com is a 
social networking site dominated primarily by the younger generation.164  
Because Avery’s blog was predominately, if not almost exclusively, 
viewed by her peers, school officials should not have reasonably 
expected that Avery’s post would encourage an older generation, those 
that likely sent the emails and made the phone calls, to contact 
administrators “to piss [them] off more.”165  Wouldn’t this same older 
generation have been discouraged by Avery’s immature rant?  It seems 
reasonable to think that the generation making phone calls and sending 
emails to school officials would not be as familiar with the blog site 
Avery used to voice her displeasure.  If they did happen to stumble 
across it, the older generation most likely would have written it off as an 
adolescent tirade.  Adults would be more likely to respond to the 
carefully considered and more formal email that the Student Council 
members sent taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the court noted that its decision relied on the fact that 
Avery’s post was “at best misleading and at worst false.”166  
LiveJournal’s very purpose is to be used as “a private journal, a blog, a 
discussion forum or a social network.”167  Assuming, arguendo, that the 
information posted was false; there is no requirement that a LiveJournal 
post must be true.168  It is commonplace for kids to be dishonest in their 
own journals; however, “neither factual error nor defamatory content, 
nor a combination of the two, suffice[] to remove the First Amendment 
shield from criticism of official conduct.”169 
Last, the court determined that “participation in voluntary, 
extracurricular activities is a ‘privilege’ that can be rescinded when 
 
 164. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the generation gap between people under 25 and 
the unnaturalness of “older people” utilizing such social networking sites). 
 165. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (quoting Avery’s blog post).  See also supra note 185 and 
accompanying text (noting that Superintendant Schwartz required the assistance of her adult-son to 
actually find and access Avery’s blog-post). 
 166. Id. at 51. 
 167. LiveJournal Home Page, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Sept 23, 2009). 
 168. “Blogs and home pages provide young people an opportunity to engage in 
autobiographical expression and ‘cathartic storytelling’ that can promote self-realization and self-
reflection.”  Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1034 (quoting Susan McKay et al., Wired Whizzes or 
Techno-Slaves? Young People and Their Emergent Communication Technologies, in TALKING 
ADOLESCENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNICATION IN THE TEENAGE YEARS 185, 192 (Angie 
Williams & Crispin Thurlow eds., 2005), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/thurlow/papers/ 
McKay,Thurlow,Toomey-Zimmerman(2005)-chapter.pdf. 
 169. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (affirming the Third Circuit’s ruling that a 
stranger’s illegal conduct does not prohibit a third person from exercising First Amendment rights) 
(emphasis added). 
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students fail to comply with the obligations inherent in the activities 
themselves.”170  According to a well-respected treatise on education law: 
Students have no right or property interest in participation in 
extracurricular activities.  Participation is thus considered a privilege 
which may be extended or withdrawn at a board’s discretion . . . the 
discretion . . . is not without limit.  A board may not . . . : 
• Prevent students from participating as a penalty for the exercise of 
constitutional rights . . . . 
• Extend or withdraw the privilege to participate arbitrarily . . . . 171 
While the court is correct in stating participation in extracurricular 
activities is a privilege, the privilege cannot be revoked as a result of 
exercising the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  As 
explained, it does not matter how slight the punishment; any time there 
is a First Amendment violation, there is irreparable harm.172  In the same 
way, school administrators cannot arbitrarily punish Avery for her blog 
post when the concerted group-drafted email was, in all likelihood, the 
primary reason for the increase in calls and emails. 
In discussing the punishment itself, Principal Niehoff stated that 
Avery’s penalty was based on her “failure to accept Principal Niehoff’s 
prior suggestions regarding the proper means of expressing disagreement 
with administration policy and seeking to resolve those disagreements, 
and also because the blog included vulgar and inaccurate 
information.”173  Because the Second Circuit decided that Fraser’s 
vulgar standard was inapplicable,174 the punishment must stand based on 
Avery’s failure to accept Principal Niehoff’s suggestions regarding the 
proper means of expressing disagreement with administrative policy.  
Avery’s testimony indicated that Principal Niehoff’s suggestion 
 
 170. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 52.  Extracurricular activities can be defined as those that are 
school sponsored which supplement, but are not part of, a required academic track.  3-8 MB, 
EDUCATION LAW § 8.07 (James A. Rapp 48th ed. 2009). 
 171. 3-8 MB, EDUCATION LAW § 8.07 (James A. Rapp 48th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, the view that there is no property right to participate in extracurricular activities is not 
uniform.  Id.  “A minority of cases holds that students have constitutionally protected interests in 
extracurricular activities.”  Id.   
 172. See supra note 115 (discussing the standard of harm required for preliminary injunctive 
relief of a constitutional violation). 
 173. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 208 (D. Conn. 2007) (emphasis added).  If the 
administration punished Avery because of her blog’s vulgarity, they certainly singled her out.  The 
student who commented on Avery’s blog and referred to Superintendent Schwartz as a “dirty 
whore” was never punished and later received an award for good citizenship.  Objection to 
Summary Judgment, supra note 131, at 26. 
 174. See supra note 122. 
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regarding acting in a manner appropriate to class officers did not occur 
until April 25, 2007, the day after her LiveJournal post.175  The district 
court should have engaged in a fact-finding process to determine if a 
conversation about Avery’s expected behavior took place prior to her 
LiveJournal post.  If not, Principal Niehoff’s justification for punishing 
Avery would have no substantive value. 
What Principal Niehoff’s testimony does reveal is that she told 
Avery that using the school computer system to send a personal email 
violated the school’s internet policy.176  However, Principal Niehoff 
informed Avery that Superintendent Schwartz deserved an apology, and 
that the students should send the taxpayers a corrective email.177  Do 
administrators get to pick and choose what personal emails indeed 
violate the school’s internet policy?  It was unacceptable to send the first 
email, but Principal Niehoff recommended that the students break the 
internet policy once more for her own personal benefit.  Giving 
administrators this sort of unfettered discretion could potentially chill all 
juvenile speech.178 
The punishment was also futile because Principal Niehoff was not 
aware of Avery’s blog until May 7, 2007, thirteen days after Avery 
posted her blog.179  The court’s concern that administrators and teachers 
would be further diverted from their core educational responsibilities 
probably would have become moot almost two weeks later.  Principal 
Niehoff did not inform Avery of her punishment until May 17,180 23 
days after her LiveJournal post.  The risk of disruption surely would 
have vanished in that time. 
 
 175. See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 205.  Avery’s testimony revealed that she and Principal 
Niehoff encountered each other in the hallway.  Id.  Avery testified that Principal Niehoff told her 
that she was upset about the numerous phone calls and emails, that Jamfest was cancelled, and that 
she should draft an apology letter to Superintendent Schwartz.  Id.  Nothing in Avery’s testimony 
suggested that the two ever conversed about Avery’s duties as a class officer.  Principal Niehoff 
testified that she told Avery, among other things, that she was disappointed the Student Council 
members had sent out an email to taxpayers, that the email contained incorrect information, that she 
was open to rescheduling Jamfest, and that the students had failed to act in a manner appropriate to 
class officers.  Id.  The court relied on other students’ testimony that Jamfest was never definitively 
cancelled.  Id. at 205-06.  The court never mentioned whether they adopted Avery’s or Principal 
Niehoff’s testimony regarding whether the conversation about what constituted a class officer’s 
appropriate behavior ever took place.  If it did not, there may be another issue as to whether the 
school violated Avery’s Due Process rights.  Due Process violations are not discussed in this Note. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. For more on this slippery slope, see infra Section IV.C. 
 179. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 180. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Accordingly, the district court failed to show that Avery’s speech 
met Tinker’s standard of material and substantial disruption.181  The 
Second Circuit’s reliance on the offensive nature of Avery’s speech, 
coupled with Principal Niehoff’s insistence that Avery’s post was vulgar 
and inaccurate suggests that they merely disapproved of Avery’s speech. 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show 
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.  Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that 
engaging in the forbidden conduct would “materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation 
of the school,” the prohibition cannot be sustained.182 
The school and the judiciary’s condemnation of Avery’s word 
choice should not be enough to elicit censure under Tinker.183 
B. The Doninger Courts Distinguished Their Rulings from Patterns 
Evolving in Lower Courts 
Section II of this Note contains three categories of student speech in 
the lower courts: (1) Internet Speech Brought on Campus by the 
Speaker; (2) Internet Speech Brought on Campus by Another Student; 
and (3) Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach Campus.184  There 
is no indication from either the District of Connecticut or the Second 
Circuit that Avery’s blog was ever accessed by her or another student at 
 
 181. The district court’s only mention of the school administration continuing to receive phone 
calls and emails after the April 25, 2007 meeting was that “the two administrators continued to 
receive phone calls and emails regarding Jamfest, and it is unclear which of those communications, 
if any, resulted from Avery’s blog.”  Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (D. Conn. 
2007).  The Second Circuit said only, “Schwartz and Niehoff . . . continued to receive phone calls 
and emails in the controversy’s immediate aftermath.”  Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (emphasis added). 
 182. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing Burnside 
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 183. “The complaints simply do not rise to the level of a ‘disruption’ much less a ‘material and 
substantial interference’ . . . Certainly students . . . have a right to be ‘upset’ when confronted with a 
viewpoint with which they disagree.”  ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 12-13 (quoting K.D. v. 
Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33871, at *16-17 (W.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 2, 2005)). 
  Avery’s attorney, Jon Schoenhorn, argued that the Second Circuit’s ruling would 
emasculate students’ First Amendment rights.  Posting of Arielle Levin Becker to The Cool Justice 
Report, http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/making-world-safe-for-douche-bags.html (May 30, 
2008).  “If this [blog post] was potentially disruptive, then they might as well empty out half of the 
schools of not just Connecticut but probably in this country.”  Id. 
 184. See supra Section III.B.   
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LMHS.185  While the purpose of her post was unquestionably to solicit 
action which would occur on campus, it cannot fall under category (1) 
because, unlike J.S., Avery never accessed the website at school, nor 
told other students about the website, nor showed it to another classmate 
while at school.186  Unlike Layshock, Avery’s post did not cause the 
school’s computer system to be shut down for five days nor was the 
school district’s technology coordinator forced to dedicate 25 percent of 
his time to blocking students’ access to her post.187 
Even assuming that we consider Mrs. Schwartz’s adult son a 
“student” at LMHS and thus classify Avery’s speech in category (2), 
courts are split as to whether the speech is protected under a student’s 
First Amendment rights.188  While the Second Circuit decided 
Wisniewski only one year before the Doninger case, Martin’s speech was 
far more taboo than Avery’s speech.189  The court rejected Principal 
Niehoff’s broad reading of Wisniewski that schools may regulate off-
campus offensive speech like Avery’s, as long as it is “likely to come to 
the attention of school authorities.”190  Relying on the Wisniewski test, as 
articulated in Tinker, the Second Circuit determined that Avery’s post 
would foreseeably reach school property.191  However, what the Second 
Circuit did not mention was that her post reached school grounds not 
 
 185. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (finding that the administration learned of Avery’s 
LiveJournal post only after Superintendent Schwartz’s adult son found it while using an internet 
search engine).   
 186. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 189. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit followed Tinker in holding that a student may be 
punished for expressive conduct occurring off school grounds when this conduct “would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,” only if it was 
“similarly foreseeable that the off campus expression might also reach campus.”  Doninger, 527 
F.3d at 48.  The court thought Judge Newman’s concurrence in Thomas v. Board of Education to be 
applicable to Avery’s case.  Judge Newman observed, “territoriality is not necessarily a useful 
concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”  Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd. 
of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in 
the result)). 
 190. Id. at 50.  However, the Second Circuit did accept Niehoff’s alternative argument that 
Avery’s speech met the Tinker standard.  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling 
even though the lower court did not expressly rely on Tinker.  Id.  In so deciding, the Second Circuit 
opted not to decide which other standards to apply when considering the extent to which a school 
may discipline off-campus speech.  Id. 
 191. Id.  Although Avery’s speech was created off-campus, the court argued that it was 
purposely designed to come onto campus.  Id.  “The blog posting directly pertained to events at 
LMHS, and Avery’s intent in writing it was specifically to encourage her fellow students to read 
and respond.”  Id.  Avery’s classmates did indeed read and post comments in response to Avery.  Id.  
The Second Circuit noted that Avery’s post managed to reach school administrators.  Id. 
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through any action by her or fellow classmates, but from an 
administrator’s son searching his mother’s name.  It seems incomparable 
to analogize a homicidal “buddy icon” to a blog post referring to the 
administration as “douchebags.”192  Additionally, Wisniewski’s 
administration had warned students that threats would be treated as acts 
of violence and would not be tolerated.193  Avery’s post fell well short of 
even implying a threatening or violent nature, nor is there any evidence 
that the student body was warned of such a strict intolerance. 
Courts which have decided cases falling into category (2) have 
strayed from the Second Circuit’s holdings and have ruled that a 
student’s speech is protected by the First Amendment.194  The Doninger 
facts draw more similarities to these cases.  In Killion, Zachariah 
actually distributed his “Top Ten” list via email to his friends,195 
whereas Avery passively posted her displeasure on an online journal.  
Like Zachariah’s list, Avery’s post was created off school grounds; there 
is no evidence that Avery brought the list onto school grounds, and the 
school district arguably failed to meet Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard.196  Avery’s language was arguably less offensive than 
 
 192. Avery’s attorney voiced his concern with the Second Circuit’s decision to follow 
Wisniewski, stating, “[t]hey appear to equate words with bullets . . . And that is a scary prospect to 
me.”  Becker, supra note 179.  
Some commentators believe that student speech “cannot become on-campus speech simply 
whenever a third party or a school official brings or accesses the material on the Internet at school.”  
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1057.   
 193. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
 194. See supra Part II.B.2.a. and supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 195. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., supra note 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Western District of 
Pennsylvania’s holding in Killion); supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing why Avery’s conduct failed to 
meet the Tinker standard).  See also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that “[t]he district court thus correctly determined that in these circumstances, ‘it was reasonably 
foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog and that school administrators would 
become aware of it.’”) (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 217 (D. Conn. 2007)).  
The Tinker test is not whether it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the administration would become 
aware of Avery’s post, but whether her actions would materially and substantially interfere with the 
school’s operations.  See supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing the Tinker standard).  
Neither the District of Connecticut nor the Second Circuit provided significant analysis as to 
whether the emails and phone calls to the school for a few days (arguably not enough to invoke a 
substantial disruption) came as a result of the students’ emails to the taxpayers or as a result of 
Avery’s post to an obscure online site.   
“Substantially” means just that.  Mere student “buzz,” i.e. animated discussion in 
response to the speech content, does not rise to the level of “substantial disruption” . . . 
Nor do the shock, outrage, revulsion or hurt feelings of teachers or administrators . . . . 
Rather, the anticipated disruptive effect must be severe enough to threaten academic 
“discipline” to the point where the school cannot “operate normally.” 
ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 3. 
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Zachariah’s because it did not personally attack her administrators’ 
appearance nor did it tastelessly refer to their genitalia.197   
Under category (2), Avery’s actions were probably most similar to 
Brandon Beussink’s conduct.  Both Brandon and Avery posted 
inappropriate language to a website to express displeasure with the 
school’s administration.  Brandon’s behavior went one step further in 
that he created his own website for the purpose of criticizing the faculty 
and staff and posted a link to his school’s homepage, hoping his readers 
would contact the school’s principal with their disapproval.198  The 
Eastern District of Missouri found that Brandon was wrongfully 
suspended because his punishment was a result of the administration 
being upset with his actions.199  Likewise, Avery’s discipline came 
twenty-three days after her controversial language was posted online.200  
The lingering effects of her words were probably an upset administration 
rather than a material and substantial disruption that lasted almost three 
and a half weeks. 
However, because Avery’s speech was neither brought on campus 
by her nor by another student, it seems that its most logical fit would be 
under category (3): Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach 
Campus.  The Eastern District of Michigan upheld a student’s First 
Amendment rights when he posted murder “missions” on a webpage 
after admitting that school computers “may have been used to create the 
website.”201  If a court can uphold a student’s free speech rights in 
creating a website which listed fellow students as people he wished 
would die,202 courts should likewise uphold Avery’s right to use 
questionable, juvenile language to vent her disapproval. 
Similarly, the Second Circuit should have followed the Western 
District of Washington’s decision in Emmett.203  Like Avery, Nick 
Emmett was a good student, actively involved in extracurricular 
activities, and had no disciplinary background.204  While Nick’s speech 
was arguably more distasteful than Avery’s speech in that his website 
 
 197. See supra note 63 (reproducing Zachariah’s “Top Ten” list). 
 198. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
 202. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that Joshua 
listing names under the heading “people I wish would die” was no more of a threat to those listed 
than Joshua listing names under the heading “people that are cool” make those listed therein 
“cool”). 
 203. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 75. 
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provided “mock obituaries” of his friends and allowed visitors to vote on 
who would “die” next, the court held that Nick’s language was far too 
removed from school activities for the school to regulate it.205  For the 
Second Circuit to rule that LMHS administrators could punish Avery for 
her speech gives the administration an extraordinary around-the-clock 
power to police student lives and student morals.206  Accordingly, under 
either category (2) or (3), Avery would have prevailed had the Doninger 
courts followed the standard developing in the lower courts instead of 
following its own agenda.207   
C. Recommendations for a More Workable Standard 
1. The Supreme Court Must Decide This Issue to Create a Standard 
That Lower Courts Can Universally Apply 
Even though most courts continue to apply the Tinker test to 
student Internet speech cases, the Supreme Court must offer guidance to 
lower courts in order to achieve consistency.208  Some commentators 
believe Tinker to be an effective test,209 while others believe it is the 
“wrong tool” for the job.210  As it stands, “[t]here is no clear line . . . And 
the line appears to be moving.”211 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 206. See ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 5; for further discussion.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 207. The district court did not see Avery’s punishment as “discipline” but rather the denial of a 
privilege, which the court did not believe to implicate her First Amendment rights.  Black, supra 
note 151.   
The [district] court [in Donniger] decided to engage in the creative endeavor of 
redefining “discipline” and “reality” rather than accepting an unpalatable alternative: 
acknowledging that students have the constitutional right to criticize school 
administrators, as long as the on or off-campus critique does not “substantially and 
materially interfere” with school operations or the dissent levied on-campus is not lewd, 
profane or sexually explicit. 
Id. (referring to the Tinker and Fraser standards). 
 208. See Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1065.  “The lower courts are all over the map” in the 
way they apply Supreme Court precedent.  Id. 
 209. See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 21. 
“I actually think Tinker is a good balance . . . . You have the right to swing your fist in 
the air until it threatens the security of my nose.  You have the right to express your 
thoughts freely, until your expression of thoughts is or has the potential of causing 
substantial harm.  We all need to be able to deal with disagreements, and people in 
positions of authority certainly must deal with the expression of speech that challenges 
their exercise of authority.  But trashing other people for the enjoyment of trashing other 
people does not serve any purpose.” 
Id. (quoting Nancy Willard of the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use). 
 210. Brenton, supra note 137, at 1226-27. 
Any off campus speech, by any speaker, may create a material and substantial disruption 
on campus.  If Mary Beth Tinker had appeared on the evening news to protest the 
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The Tinker standard is unworkable in the Internet age because 
many courts are far too deferential to the schools’ claims that the student 
speech caused substantial disruption without applying their own 
independent analysis.212  Instead of trying to modify the Tinker standard 
to account for technology advances, courts should employ an entirely 
different standard.  Punishment based on student speech originating from 
students’ home computers should be subjected to such a heightened 
scrutiny, with regulations only being warranted if it is of such low value 
as to be considered “unprotected.”213  This type of expression differs 
from all other types considered by the Supreme Court because it requires 
affirmative steps for access, making its medium of expression much less 
pervasive than any of the Supreme Court cases already decided.214  In 
addition, regulating student speech occurring off school grounds opens 
the floodgates for school administrators to regulate almost all student 
speech.215  Because Internet speech frequently concerns topics related to 
 
Vietnam War, it could have caused a greater disruption of her school than her black 
armband, but such speech should be no more regulated than silent protest.  To employ 
the Tinker test to answer the threshold question of when [student cyberspeech should be 
regulated] is to use the wrong tool for the wrong job. 
Id. 
 211. Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 19 (quoting Nancy Willard). 
 212. Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1067 (citing Cuff v. Valley Centr. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 
2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting deferential approach of courts to First Amendment challenges 
to schools disciplining students) and Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-92 (D. 
Minn. 1987) (noting that deference to school officials is not limitless, yet concluding that the school 
could punish students even though distribution of an underground newspaper did not disrupt any 
regular school activity).  “[C]ourts generally permit the unreasonable reaction of teachers and 
school officials to constitute a disturbance.”  Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1067. 
 213. See supra note 47.  “As a bright-line rule, courts should continue to declare that speech 
that lacks any sort of physical connection to the school should fall outside the school’s jurisdiction.”  
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1090. 
 214. See supra note 102 (noting the indirect fashion in which Avery’s blog post reached the 
attention of school administrators). 
 215. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 
1979): 
  It is not difficult to imagine the lengths to which school authorities could take the 
power . . . . it is conceivable that school officials could consign a student to a segregated 
study hall because he and a classmate watched an X-rated film on his living room cable 
television.  While these activities are certainly the proper subjects of parental discipline, 
the First Amendment forbids public school administrators and teachers from regulating 
the material to which a child is exposed after he leaves school each afternoon. . . 
  The risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and 
thereby inhibit future expression.  In addition to their vested interest and susceptibility to 
community pressure, they are generally unversed in difficult constitutional concepts . . . . 
Since superintendents and principals may act “arbitrarily, erratically, or unfairly,” the 
chill on expression is greatly exacerbated. 
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classmates and teachers, permitting school authorities to restrict such 
speech gives schools unbridled discretion to restrict juvenile speech 
generally.216 
2. School Administrators Cannot Punish Student Online 
Expression Merely Because They Disapprove of the Message  
When schools rely on the “I do not like the speech the student 
chose to use” rationale, courts have a tendency to invalidate the student’s 
punishment.217  “[T]he government may not prohibit expression simply 
because it disagrees with its message . . . .”218  However, when 
administrators can provide evidence of how the student’s speech 
substantially negatively impacted the school’s operations, courts are 
more likely to uphold the school’s disciplinary measures.219  Because 
courts cannot prohibit speech because of a “mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an unpopular 
viewpoint,”220 courts imposing a presumption that the student’s speech is 
protected under the First Amendment would largely reduce the ad hoc 
balancing tests that result in as many different outcomes as there are 
 
(citing Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971)).  Allowing school 
officials to regulate speech whenever it comes to their attention would grant them the power to 
punish students who engage in political protests outside city council meetings, write inept letters to 
the editor in the local newspaper, or simply talk with friends at the mall.  Papandrea, supra note 137, 
at 1092. 
 216. Id. at 1091.  “Given this reality, it is hard to imagine when it would not be directed to 
campus, or when it would not be reasonably foreseeable that students’ digital expression would 
come to the school’s attention.”  Id. at 1091-92. 
 217. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  
“Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable justification for 
limiting student speech under Tinker.”  Id. at 1180. 
 218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (stating the First Amendment prohibits 
viewpoint based laws, “[w]e do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so 
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”)  Id. at 420. 
 219. See, e.g., supra notes 50-52 (discussing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in 
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District).  See also Posting of “SHG” to The Cool Justice Report,  
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/more-coverage-of-douche-bag-court.html (May 30, 2008) 
(stating that the Ninth Circuit did not provide evidence of how Avery’s remarks created a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption): 
While the earlier rule [Tinker] held that students maintained a constitutional right to 
speech, even within the school yard, the [Ninth] Circuit’s vision is that they not only 
forfeit speech going into the school, but do so again on the way out.  Avery’s challenge 
to school officials’ hegemony was made in a blog post, well beyond the proverbial 
schoolhouse gates of the past . . . . The test applied by the Circuit is extremely curious . . 
. weeding out acceptable exercise of Freedom of Speech because it had the potential to 
create thought and ideas that might be disruptive fundamentally undermines the right. 
Id. 
 220. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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jurisdictions.  Furthermore, Internet-use policies should be written in a 
way that clearly defines prohibited conduct.  If school districts do not 
provide students with clear guidelines, they open themselves up to 
possible due process claims when they punish students who violate an 
ambiguous policy.221 
3. School Officials May Resort to Alternative Measures to Address 
Harmful Material Students Post on the Internet 
School administrators do not have to ignore harmful material 
surfacing online even if their authority may be limited.  Before 
infractions occur, schools should educate their students on how to use 
the Internet safely and responsibly.  If students do not comply, there are 
alternatives to school-sanctioned punishment, such as notifying the 
parents or police, talking to the students involved, and offering support 
services to any troubled student.222  If speech is so endangering as to 
become actionable, the courts provide an adequate remedy that is 
sufficient to punish truly threatening behavior.223  Schools can 
effectively ensure that troubled students receive the help they need 
without overzealously policing their every online commentary.   
More importantly, parents are far better suited to monitor and 
regulate their child’s online behavior.224  “Parents still have their role to 
play in bringing up their children, and school officials, in such instances, 
 
 221. See supra note 175 (discussing due process in Donniger).  See e.g., Coy v. Bd. Of Educ. 
Canton City Schools, 205 F.Supp.2d 791, (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing a student challenge to a 
high school’s discipline codes and internet-use policies). 
 222. See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 26.  “There is a lot that schools can do short of 
imposing disciplinary actions,  such as educating kids about responsibilities online and educating 
parents about the Internet.  If a school official is aware of cyberbullying, one option is . . . [to] call 
the parent of the student.”  Id. (quoting National School Boards Association Staff Attorney Thomas 
Hutton).   
 223. See Brenton, supra note 138, at 1244 (stating that the juvenile justice system protects 
against “true threats” and punishes dangerous behavior). 
 224. Cf. Thomas E. Wheeler II, Lessons from The Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of 
Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 Educ. L. Rep. 227, 
244 (2007) (“While school administrators are given broad discretion . . . they must resist the 
temptation to over regulate . . . . The ethical responsibility for individual conduct must rest with the 
individual, and not the schools.  The primary teachers are parents and families, not governmental 
agencies.”).  
  Avery’s mother did indeed “police” Avery’s poor choice in words.  “My mother also put 
my word choice on her scale of justice.  She found my comment rude, sophomoric, and below the 
standards she has set.  My mother’s verdict, as one commentator put it, ‘Avery, you’re grounded 
and we’re going to the Supreme Court.’”  Avery Doninger, supra note 152 (quoting Colin McEnroe, 
WTIC radio AM 1080 broadcasted October 2, 2007). 
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are not empowered to assume the character of Parens patriae.”225  
Instead of simulating a parental role, school officials might want to 
discuss the possible consequences of Internet speech, its lack of 
anonymity, and the real harms that speech can cause.226   
V. CONCLUSION 
Student Internet speech may be tactless and inflammatory, causing 
infinite problems for school administrators attempting to maintain order 
and teach civility to young people.227  Nevertheless, students are entitled 
to First Amendment rights in public schools, even if the rights are 
somewhat limited.228  This Note proposes that under current Supreme 
Court precedent, Avery Doninger’s speech did not materially and 
substantially disrupt her school’s operations.229  In the alternative, this 
Note explains that the District of Connecticut and the Second Circuit 
should have followed evolving lower court precedent in their Doninger 
holdings because Avery’s language was not brought on-campus by her 
or another student but rather it was speech that may have foreseeably 
 
 225. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that a county board of education could not suspend students for publishing and distributing 
a satirical paper almost exclusively produced after school hours and off school property). 
 226. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 3.  “A truly private life is already an illusion . . . . [High 
school students seem] to have a high tolerance for what used to be personal information splashed in 
the public square.”  Id. at 5.  Consider Casey Serin, who purchased eight houses in eight months, 
looking to “fix ‘n’ flip,” only to end up in massive debt.  Id. at 5.  He detailed his bad investments 
online.  According to Serin, 
Once you put something online, you really cannot take it back . . . . You’ve got to be 
careful what you say – but once you say it, you’ve got to stand by it.  And the only way 
to repair it is to continue to talk, to explain myself, to see it through.  If I shut down, I’m 
at the mercy of what other people say. 
Id. at 5.  While this story may seem irrelevant to the subject matter, it is important for school 
officials to get the point across to their students that they will be accountable for all material posted 
online.  According to Vic Walczak of the ACLU of Pennsylvania, 
Kids have to understand there is a practical difference between playground/water-cooler 
talk and posting something on the Internet . . . . When you post something on the 
Internet, there can be REAL-WORLD consequences.  Some of the stuff on the Internet is 
mind-boggling . . . . While school officials may not legally be able to punish you, there 
may be other real-life consequences that should give students pause about posting 
something the whole world can see. 
Hudson, Jr., supra note 5, at 24. 
 227. See supra Section II. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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reached campus.230  Lower courts have traditionally upheld a student’s 
constitutional right to speak such language.231 
This Note cannot offer a perfect solution that would ensure that 
school administrators know which speech they may punish and which 
student speech has constitutionally protected interests.  Nor may there be 
a perfectly articulable checklist that the Supreme Court may establish to 
offer school officials.  Instead, this Note proposes that the High Court 
create a more workable standard to offer some guidance in an emerging 
area of law that has not been re-evaluated since the days of the Vietnam 
War.232 
 
 230. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra Section IV.C. 
  Some commentators believe that Judge Sotomayor’s appointment to the Supreme Court 
may have harsh implications for the First Amendment: 
  Blogger Paul Levinson, a professor of communications and media studies at Fordham 
University, has followed Avery’s case from the outset and believes that President Obama made a 
mistake in nominating Sotomayor.  Posting of Steve Collins to BristolToday.com, 
http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-under-scrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27, 
2009, 16:37 EST).  According to Levinson, “[l]ast time I checked, I thought our democracy and 
freedom were predicated on the principle that all people have a right to express their opinions, 
which must certainly include disrespect for authority.”  Id.  In declaring the First Amendment the 
most primary Amendment for protection of freedoms, Levinson asked, “[i]sn’t performance on the 
Appellate Court the best possible gauge of performance on the Supreme Court?  Are not the stakes 
on the Supreme Court just too high, too lasting, to take a chance on an Appellate judge with even 
just one bad decision?”  Why One Strike Against the First Amendment Should Rule Sotomayor Out 
of the Supreme Court, http://paullevinson.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-one-strike-against-first-
amendment.html (May 26, 2009) (using a baseball analogy to discuss how Sotomayor is not the best 
person to appoint for the rest of her life to one of nine positions on a Supreme Court dominated by 
Justices who narrowly interpret the First Amendment).   
  The National Coalition Against Censorship recognized that in the Doninger holding, the 
Second Circuit was comprised of two conservative-leaning judges and Judge Sotomayor, who may 
have been influenced by her right-leaning peers.  Posting of Hannah Mueller to The National 
Coalition Against Censorship, http://ncacblog.wordpress.com/2009/06/02/student-speech-under-
fire-under-sotomayor/ (June 2, 2009, 08:51 EST).  However, “[f]rom what we’ve seen so far, 
Sotomayor has done more to weaken First Amendment rights than to protect them.”  Id.   
  Some commentators have used a statistical approach to argue that Sotomayor is not as 
liberal as President Obama may have people believe.  Posting of Zach Miners to Yahoo! News, 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/usnews/wheredoesjudgesoniasotomayorstandonschoolissues (June 12, 
2009, 15:49 EST).  Perry Zirkel, a professor of education and law at Lehigh University, believes 
that Sotomayor’s record suggests that she is conservative on education issues.  Id.  Zirkel’s analysis 
showed that Sotomayor ruled in favor of school districts 83 percent of the time in decisions on 
“regular education” and 58 percent of the time in decisions on special-education cases.  Id. 
  Other commentators have not been so academic in their assessments.  Sotomayor is 
known as a dominating personality who is very tough during oral argument, leading blogger Alex 
Knepper to wonder “whether the case would have been different had it been a young Latina girl 
complaining about the cancellation of a cultural festival.”  Sonia Sotomayor: Free Speech 
Opponent?, http://race42008.com/2009/05/28/sonia-sotomayor-free-speech-opponent/ (May 28, 
2009, 24:10 EST).  Andy Thibault, whose Cool Justice Report has followed the Doninger case from 
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the start, said that Sotomayor “was clubbed on the head with a crystal-clear free speech violation 
and she said, in effect, ‘That’s nice, I’ll sign off on it.’  When a citizen seeks a redress of a 
grievance and is punished for lobbying the community, that’s OK with Sotomayor.”  Posting of 
Steve Collins to BristolToday.com, http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-under-
scrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27, 2009, 16:37 EST).   
  Because this issue is so novel to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, I 
could not accurately predict how it would handle Avery’s case.  Even under current Supreme Court 
precedent, the First Amendment should protect a student’s right to call her school officials 
“douchebags” or to lobby citizens for support, even if it is intended to “piss off” administrators.  
Though Sotomayor endorsed the Doninger ruling by voting for it, she may not agree with every 
detail and nuance of the opinion.   
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